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INTRODUCTION
In 1966, five Justices of the Supreme Court sought to civilize police
interrogation in America. 1 Fifty years later, their efforts appear to have been an
abject failure. As Scott Howe observes, today’s law of interrogation “facilitates
bad behavior all around.” 2 Howe’s criticism of interrogation practices today
resembles the criticism offered by Yale Kamisar shortly before Miranda. 3
Howe writes:
For criminal suspects, the law rewards obstruction and concealment. For
∗

Julius Kreeger Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology Emeritus, the University of
Chicago Law School. I am grateful to Paul Cassell and Tracey Maclin for valuable
comments.
1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 Scott W. Howe, Moving Beyond Miranda: Concessions for Confessions, 110 NW. U. L.
REV. 905, 907 (2016).
3 See Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American
Criminal Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, from Escobedo to . . ., in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
OUR TIME 3, 64 (A. E. Dick Howard ed., 1965). The Miranda majority cited this work
twice. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440 n.2; id. at 472 n.41. A Miranda dissenter cited it once. Id.
at 511 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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police officers, it honors deceit and psychological aggression. For the
courts and the rest of us, it encourages blindness and rationalization. . . .
....
It goes far to protect noncooperation and cover-up by the most
knowledgeable, cunning, and steely criminals, while providing only
minimal safeguards for those who are uneducated, unintelligent, or easily
coerced. It permits . . . trickery, harassment, and the inducement of
despair . . . . It invites courts . . . to declare the irrational or inveigled
decisions of arrestees to talk to police as “knowing,” “intelligent,” and
“voluntary,” torturing the meaning of these words . . . . 4
Miranda’s failure was foreseeable. From the outset, this decision has been:
(1) A Doctrinal Failure (a) because Miranda seriously misconstrued the
Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination; (b) because
the artificiality of Miranda’s rules has produced a mountain of
nonsense law; and (c) because Miranda promised legal assistance at
the stationhouse while ensuring that suspects would not get it;
(2) An Ethical Failure (a) because the extravagant right to remain silent
asserted by Miranda runs counter to ordinary moral principles; and
(b) because the unwillingness of just about everyone actually to
honor this right has produced a system relying on exploitation and
deception;
(3) A Jurisprudential Failure because Miranda departed from the
appropriate role of courts; and
(4) An Empirical Failure because Miranda did next to nothing to
protect suspects from police abuse.
I.

THE INITIAL DOCTRINAL FAILURE: MIRANDA’S MISUNDERSTANDING OF
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

A. Compulsion
The famous fourfold forewarning begins, “You have a right to remain
silent.” 5 The Supreme Court explained, “For those unaware of the privilege,
the warning is needed simply to make them aware of it.” 6 The privilege against
self-incrimination, however, does not guarantee an unqualified right to remain

4

Howe, supra note 2, at 905-07 (footnotes omitted).
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 467-68; id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing the
majority opinion) (“The foremost requirement, upon which the later admissibility of a
confession depends, is that a four-fold warning be given to a person in custody before he is
questioned, namely, that he has a right to remain silent, that anything he says may be used
against him, that he has a right to have present an attorney during the questioning, and that if
indigent he has a right to a lawyer without charge.”).
6 Id. at 468 (majority opinion).
5
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silent. It says only that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.” 7 The crucial constitutional concept is
compulsion.
Legal prohibitions of compulsion are ubiquitous. Just as you may not be
compelled to incriminate yourself, you may not be compelled to enter a
contract, make a will, or have sex. But forbidding compulsion to enter a
contract does not preclude persuasion to enter a contract. It requires the
authorities to mark a line between legitimate and illegitimate means of
convincing you. 8
You have a right not to enter a contract in the sense that you cannot be
imprisoned, whipped, or water-boarded for refusing to enter it. Forbidding
compulsion to enter a contract, however, does not mean that no one will think
less of you for refusing to enter a contract, that no one will draw adverse
inferences from your refusal to enter a contract, or that no one will ever try
earnestly and repeatedly to convince you to enter a contract. Prohibiting
compulsion to enter a contract does not mean that refusing to enter a contract
will never make things worse for you. 9 If the word “compulsion” in the Fifth
Amendment were to be given its ordinary meaning, your right to remain silent
would be no broader than your right to refuse to enter a contract. 10

7

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Albert W. Alschuler, Constraint and Confession, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 957, 965-67
(1997) (noting that a focus on overborne wills in coercion cases is misplaced and that a
better focus is “the propriety or impropriety of human influences on choice”).
9 Hardly anyone would proclaim, “Declining to enter a contract should not lead to any
adverse consequences because declining to enter a contract is a right.”
10 Defending Miranda, Steven Schulhofer maintained that a statement can be
“compelled” even when it is not “coerced” or “involuntary.” See Steven J. Schulhofer,
Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 440-45 (1987). In ordinary English usage,
however, a right not to be “compelled” does not prohibit any governmental action that the
Fifth Amendment would have permitted if its text had used the word “coerced” instead.
“Coercion” refers to actions by human beings that improperly influence choice.
“Compulsion” includes these actions, but it also (and perhaps more clearly) includes human
actions that disable choice entirely and natural events that either deprive a person of choice
or else strongly influence his choice.
For example, a villain both coerces and compels me to remain where I am when he
threatens to shoot me if I move. He compels me to stay where I am but does not coerce me
when he ties me down instead. Sub-zero weather may compel me to wear a coat, but it does
not coerce me to wear a coat. When the Framers of the Fifth Amendment spoke of
“compulsion,” they referred to human actions improperly influencing choice.
Schulhofer does not in fact contend that ordinary usage suggests any relevant difference
between the word “coercion” and the word “compulsion.” See Schulhofer, supra, at 442
n.17. His argument appears to be that Miranda was not the first Supreme Court decision to
give the word “compulsion” a strange and artificial meaning. See Joseph D. Grano,
Miranda’s Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
174, 182-86 (1988).
8
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B. The Griffin-Miranda Misinterpretation
A year before Miranda, the Supreme Court appeared to equate compulsion
with any action that makes a choice disadvantageous. In Griffin v. California, 11
it held jury instructions unconstitutional because they allowed a jury to draw
an adverse inference from a defendant’s failure to explain incriminating
evidence. 12 For the Court, it was enough that comment on a defendant’s failure
to testify “cut[] down on the [constitutional] privilege by making its assertion
costly.” 13 Any adverse comment “compelled” speech because it disadvantaged
silence. Even if drawing an adverse inference might lead to more accurate
verdicts, the Constitution barred the government from tilting the scales in favor
of speaking.
The Court’s view that the government may not make silence costly departed
not only from the ordinary meaning of the constitutional text but also from the
Framers’ understanding of this text. 14 At the Framing, although defendants
were not sworn, they were expected to explain incriminating evidence during
pretrial interrogation by a magistrate and then to explain it again at trial. Few if
any defendants remained silent, and jurors would have viewed their silence as
incriminating if they had. 15

11

380 U.S. 609 (1965).
Id. at 615.
13 Id. at 614. The Court could not have meant this statement literally. Presenting a strong
prima facie case of a defendant’s guilt often makes it costly for him to remain silent, but the
Fifth Amendment does not bar a prosecutor from presenting a strong case.
14 See id. at 620 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
15 See J. M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND: 1660-1800, at 348-49 (1986)
(describing eighteenth century English trials) (“There was no thought that the prisoner had a
right to remain silent on the grounds that he would otherwise be liable to incriminate
himself . . . . [T]he assumption was clear that if the case against him was false the prisoner
ought to say so and suggest why, and that if he did not speak that could only be because he
was unable to deny the truth of the evidence.”); John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1048-49
(1994) (explaining how common law procedures produced the “accused speaks” trial); Eben
Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Constitutional Origins of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1091 (1994) (indicating that American practice
at the time of the Framing was no different from the English practice described by Beattie
and Langbein); see also Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical
Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2651-60 (1996).
Rather than speak of chilling the exercise of a defendant’s right not to testify, Griffin
might have concluded that comment on a defendant’s failure to testify directly violated the
privilege by converting even a silent defendant into a witness against himself. If a guilty
defendant testified and spoke the truth, he would incriminate himself, and if he remained
silent, he would again incriminate himself. Because this defendant could not avoid
incriminating himself, he was “compelled” to incriminate himself. This analysis would have
rested on a plausible interpretation of the constitutional text. Like the analysis upon which
Griffin relied, however, it would have departed from the historic understanding of this text.
12
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Miranda echoed Griffin. Declaring it “impermissible to penalize an
individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under
police custodial interrogation,” the Court declared that “[t]he prosecution may
not . . . use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the
face of accusation.” 16 The Court said that the government must “shoulder the
entire load.” 17 From the Court’s perspective, it apparently was unconstitutional
to encourage a criminal suspect to reveal what he knows. 18
Miranda observed, “[T]he privilege is fulfilled only when the person is
guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the
unfettered exercise of his own will.’” 19 It added, “Our aim is to assure that the
individual’s right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered
throughout the interrogation process.” 20 These statements indicated that the
government must remain neutral between silence and speech. Other statements,
however—particularly the Court’s talk of waiver—seemed to tilt the scales in
favor of silence. The Court wrote, “If the interrogation continues without the
presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the
government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his privilege against self-incrimination . . . .” 21 Under Miranda as
originally conceived, a suspect might choose to speak, but it wouldn’t be easy.
Miranda’s emphasis on waiver underscored its misunderstanding of the
privilege. If the Fifth Amendment guaranteed an unqualified right to remain
silent, suspects might intelligently waive this right, but, as Justice Marshall
once observed, “[N]o sane person would knowingly relinquish a right to be
free of compulsion.” 22
See infra note 79 (criticizing this alternate rationale for Griffin).
16 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966).
17 Id. at 460 (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
317 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
18 Although the Framers had no objection to drawing an adverse inference from an
unsworn defendant’s silence before a magistrate or at trial, they might not have approved of
drawing an adverse inference from a defendant’s refusal to offer sworn testimony. See
Alschuler, supra note 15, at 2653. Griffin, however, offered no indication that a refusal to
testify under oath might differ from any other form of silence, and Miranda extended the
right to remain silent to unsworn suspects. Even if the Framers might have approved of the
result in Griffin, they would have disapproved of the right to silence created by Miranda.
19 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).
20 Id. at 469.
21 Id. at 475.
22 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 281 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
History helps to explain the Court’s conceptual and terminological confusion. When,
before the turn of the eighteenth century, English courts recognized a testimonial privilege
against self-incrimination, the principal (and perhaps the only) beneficiaries of this privilege
were prosecution witnesses and witnesses in civil cases. Alschuler, supra note 15, at 2659.
Criminal defendants had no need for a testimonial privilege because they were not placed on
oath. Although these defendants were expected to tell their stories both before trial and at
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C. Doctrinal Mud
Miranda apparently interpreted the Fifth Amendment to confer a right to
remain silent that one must knowingly waive. But one of Miranda’s rulings
was flatly inconsistent with this interpretation. A suspect’s knowledge or
ignorance of his right to remain silent does not depend on whether he is in
custody. If the Fifth Amendment requires a knowing waiver of the right to
remain silent, the police should be required to advise a suspect of this right and
to obtain a knowing waiver whenever they ask him to incriminate himself. 23
trial, they were not “witnesses,” and the inferences jurors would have drawn if they had
remained silent were not seen as compulsion. See id. at 2657-58.
Because prosecution witnesses and witnesses in civil cases were sworn to tell the truth,
their refusal to speak subjected them to imprisonment for contempt, and the threat of
imprisonment unmistakably qualifies as compulsion. See id. at 2659. Common-law judges,
however, allowed them to decline to answer when their testimony would be incriminating.
See Trial of John Friend, 13 How. St. Tr. 1, 17 (1696) (“[N]o man is bound to answer any
question that will subject him to a penalty or to infamy.”). At common law, a sworn witness
had “a right to remain silent” when his answers would incriminate him. Of course he could
“waive” this right by answering incriminating questions.
But a witness whose sworn answers would incriminate him had a “right to remain silent”
only because, in the absence of an evidentiary privilege, he would have been subject to
“compulsion” to speak. The authors of the privilege did not imagine that a “right to remain
silent”—a right one must “waive”—extended to people who were not under oath and not
subject to compulsion. Before Miranda, some commentators contended in fact that the
privilege against self-incrimination did not apply to stationhouse interrogation:
Since police have no legal right to compel answers, there is no legal obligation to
which a privilege in the technical sense can apply. That is, it makes no sense to say that
one is privileged not to disclose—that one is excused from the legal consequences of
contumacy—when there are no legal consequences of contumacy.
WIGMORE, supra note 17, at 329 n.27.
These commentators overlooked the fact that imprisonment for contempt is not the only
sort of compulsion the privilege forbids. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 203 n.18 (1997) (showing that the Framers saw the
privilege as outlawing torture); Alschuler, supra note 15, at 2647-52 (same). The Fifth
Amendment prohibits compulsion by police officers as well as by judges. See Bram v.
United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897); Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship
Between the Privilege Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary
Confession Rule (Part I), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 143-47, 152-53, 168-69, 178-79 (1992).
Nevertheless, conflating a sworn witness’s right to refuse to answer incriminating questions
with a general right to refuse to answer is a mistake. In the absence of an oath subjecting a
witness to compulsion, finding a Fifth Amendment violation depends on finding compulsion
somewhere else. Nothing in the Constitution indicates that the Framers expected the
government to “shoulder the entire load.” The Fifth Amendment forbids using
imprisonment, torture, and other harsh measures to induce self-incrimination.
23 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, 492 (1964) (emphasizing—in the first
decision to extend the right to counsel to police interrogation—that “the investigation [was]
no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but [had] begun to focus on a particular
suspect”). But see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 n.4 (claiming incredibly that, when Escobedo
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Whether the suspect is under arrest should not matter. Miranda, however,
limited its protections to suspects in custody. 24 If the Fifth Amendment
guarantees a right to remain silent that one must knowingly waive, Miranda
seems seriously under protective.
The Court explained its focus on custody by declaring that, in the absence of
proper safeguards, “the process of in-custody interrogation . . . contains
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will
to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely.” 25 This statement indicated that the Court might not regard the Fifth
Amendment as guaranteeing all suspects, even those not in custody, an
unqualified right to remain silent. Perhaps the Court had not abandoned the
ordinary meaning of “compulsion” after all, and perhaps it was still concerned
with evaluating the quality and extent of the pressures brought to bear upon a
suspect. Perhaps officials could still tilt the scales in favor of revealing
incriminating information as long as they did so within appropriate limits. 26
The Court reinforced the sense that it was concerned with genuine
“compulsion” when it devoted several pages of its opinion to describing the
psychological stratagems recommended by police interrogation manuals. 27 It
accurately observed that many of the tactics endorsed by these manuals would
be judged coercive if someone used them, not to obtain a confession, but to
induce a “well-to-do testatrix” to alter her will. 28
To claim that every incriminating response to postarrest questioning is the
product of compulsion, however, would be extravagant. Following an arrest, a
suspect might ask what he’s charged with, and an officer might answer this
question truthfully. If, in the absence of warnings, the officer then inquired,
“Did you do it?” and the suspect said “Yes,” Miranda would require exclusion
of the suspect’s answer. The reason, however, cannot be that the officer
compelled the suspect’s response—not if the word “compulsion” retains its
ordinary meaning. 29 If the Fifth Amendment bars only compulsion, Miranda
seems overly protective. 30
said “focus,” it meant “custody”).
24 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (defining custodial interrogation as “questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way”).
25 Id. at 467.
26 The Court might have seen custody as supplying “compulsion” in the same way that
English courts once saw testimonial oaths as supplying compulsion. See supra note 22.
27 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-55.
28 Id. at 457 n.26 (quoting Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Crime and Confession, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 21, 37 (1965)).
29 But see Schulhofer, supra note 10, at 446-53 (apparently arguing that even in this
hypothetical scenario the suspect’s answer can fairly be presumed to be the product of
compulsion).
30 The Supreme Court declared, “In these cases, we might not find the defendants’
statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms. Our concern for adequate
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One need not read Miranda to say either that the Fifth Amendment requires
every suspect to make a knowing waiver of the right to remain silent (an
interpretation that leaves Miranda protecting too little) or that it deems every
incriminating statement obtained through in-custody interrogation a product of
compulsion (a proposition that leaves Miranda protecting too much). A third
reading sees Miranda as providing prophylactic protection against compulsion.
The suspect’s statement in the scenario just described must be excluded, not
because this statement itself is deemed compelled, but because excluding it
makes compulsion in other situations less likely.
How Miranda guards against compulsion, however, is unclear. The Court
wrote, “The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is . . . not simply a
preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.” 31 When suspects
waive their Miranda rights, however—as more than three-quarters do 32—
Miranda’s formalities are no more than a preliminary ritual to the methods the
Court deplored. 33 One wonders how the Court could have imagined that its

safeguards to protect precious Fifth Amendment rights is, of course, not lessened in the
slightest.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457. When our precious Fifth Amendment confers only a
right not to be “compelled,” however, it bars only “compelled” or “involuntary” statements.
31 Id. at 476.
32 See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An
Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 859 (1996) (reporting that
83.7% of 173 suspects whom the police advised of their Miranda rights waived them—
although 3.9% withdrew their initial waivers before questioning ended); Barry C. Feld,
Behind Closed Doors: What Really Happens When Cops Question Kids?, 23 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 395, 429 (2013) (reporting that 92.8% of 307 juvenile suspects in recorded
interrogations waived their Miranda rights); Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of
Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219,
255-56 (2006) (reporting that 80% of 53 sixteen- and seventeen-year-old suspects whose
video-recorded interrogations were included in prosecutors’ files waived their Miranda
rights); Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 226,
286 (1996) (reporting that 78% of the suspects in 182 directly observed or recorded police
interrogations in California waived their Miranda rights).
33 See FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS 1
(2d ed. 1967) (“As we interpret the June, 1966, five to four decision . . . , all but a very few
of the interrogation tactics and techniques presented in our earlier publication are still valid
if used after the recently prescribed warnings have been given to the suspect . . . , and after
he has waived his self-incrimination privilege and his right to counsel.”); Howe, supra note
2, at 933 (“Miranda . . . allows the police, after securing a waiver, to use at least as much
deceit and pressure as they could have employed under the old due process ‘voluntariness’
test.”).
The Supreme Court has come close to treating compliance with Miranda’s formalities as
giving the police a safe harbor. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984)
(“[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating
statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that law enforcement authorities adhered to the
dictates of Miranda are rare.”). In some respects, moreover, the Court has weakened the
voluntariness standards it applied before Miranda. For example, the Court has abandoned
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“safeguards” would ever be anything else.
Most of the suspects who invoke their Miranda rights probably would not
have cooperated with the police in the absence of Miranda. Perhaps, however,
the decision emboldened some suspects who otherwise would have succumbed

the centuries-old rule that confessions may not be “obtained by any direct or implied
promises, however slight”—a development described infra in text at notes 47-57. The
decision in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003), suggests another way in which the
Court has become less receptive to claims of coercion.
Chavez concerned the interrogation in a hospital emergency room of a suspect who had
been shot several times, leaving him partially blinded, paralyzed from the waist down, and
in great pain. Id. at 764 (plurality opinion). At one point, this suspect told the interrogating
officer, “If you treat me, I tell you everything, if not, no.” Id. at 786 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (setting forth an English translation of the emergency-room
questioning). Although the suspect in fact received medical treatment, the officer apparently
questioned him without disabusing him of the idea that he would receive treatment only if
he talked. Id. at 784-86. The suspect was not prosecuted, but he alleged in a civil lawsuit
that the interrogating officer violated his constitutional rights. Id. at 764-65 (plurality
opinion).
Chavez’s principal holding was that, because the suspect was not prosecuted, the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination had no bearing on his case. In the Court’s
view, the privilege does not forbid torturing suspects to induce them to talk; it forbids only
the use at trial of incriminating statements obtained through torture and other forms of
compulsion. Id. at 773. The Court, however, remanded the suspect’s case to permit a lower
court to determine whether his interrogation violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 779-80
(Souter, J., concurring) (providing the one-sentence opinion of the Court on this point).
What the Court said about due process standards has received considerably less attention
than its ruling concerning the limited scope of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Several Chavez opinions indicated that the issue under the Due Process Clause was
whether the police conduct “shock[ed] the conscience.” Id. at 774 (plurality opinion); id. at
779, 783 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849
(1998)); id. at 787 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)). No Justice in fact questioned the use of this standard.
For decades prior to Miranda’s elaboration of a system for protecting the Fifth Amendment
privilege, however, the Supreme Court had evaluated the voluntariness of confessions under
the Due Process Clause, and the words “shock the conscience” never appeared in its
opinions. Instead, the Court insisted that the exclusion of improperly obtained confessions
rested on the idea that “the police must obey the law while enforcing the law.” Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959). It wrote:
Our decisions . . . have made clear that convictions following the admission into
evidence of [involuntary] confessions . . . cannot stand . . . not because such
confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to extract them offend
an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an
accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system . . . .
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
Miranda appears largely to have halted the development of voluntariness standards under
the Due Process Clause. It may in fact have encouraged judges to weaken the standards
previously developed. Judges, lawyers, and academics have all taken their eyes off the ball.
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to coercive interrogation to opt out of interrogation altogether or to halt
questioning already underway. It is only in this sense that Miranda may guard
against compulsion. 34
None of the alternative readings of Miranda make much sense, but they
enable Miranda’s defenders to respond to criticism of one possible reading by
insisting that the decision is “really” about something else. More significant
than the weakness of each interpretation is the fact that no one can tell which
interpretation is correct. Miranda moves from statements indicating that the
government must remain neutral between silence and speech to statements
indicating a strong presumption in favor of silence to statements suggesting
that the government must merely refrain from coercion. No one knows what
Miranda means. Perhaps the Court cared less about providing a coherent
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment than about devising a legislative code
for police interrogation. The Court’s doctrinal confusion might have stemmed
from its misconception of its role. 35
D. The Significance of the No-Penalty-for-Silence Decisions: A Cruel
Trilemma for Miranda’s Defenders
It is difficult to envision a milder or more appropriate “penalty” for a
suspect’s refusal to explain incriminating evidence than allowing a fact finder
to consider this refusal for whatever evidentiary significance it may have. By
declaring this “penalty” impermissible, Griffin and Miranda confirm what
some of their rhetoric suggests—that the government may not make silence
costly in any way. This misunderstanding of the Fifth Amendment has
implications that extend beyond forbidding comment on silence. It ensures that
police interrogation can have only one purpose—tricking and cajoling suspects
into doing something that is not in their interest.
This Article has noted that, just as you may not be compelled to incriminate
yourself, you may not be compelled to enter a contract. Entering a contract,
however, and answering police questions are very different moves. Entering a
contract sometimes can make you better off, but when the courts forbid even
rational inferences from silence, submitting to police interrogation never can.
Especially (but not only) when you are guilty, agreeing to answer police
questions is likely to send you to the penitentiary. 36 Justice Jackson remarked,

34

Interrogating officers conceivably might refrain from coercion because they
understand that suspects have the power to bring interrogation to a halt. There is no reason,
however, to believe that Miranda has changed in the slightest the way the police interrogate
suspects after these suspects waive their rights.
35 See infra Part VI.
36 James Duane marvelously demonstrates this fact in both his popular lecture Don’t Talk
to
the
Police,
Regent
Law,
YOUTUBE
(Mar.
20,
2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d-7o9xYp7eE, and his recent book, JAMES DUANE, YOU
HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN INNOCENT (2016). Duane describes several miscarriages of
justice that occurred only because innocent suspects agreed to cooperate with deceptive
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“[A]ny lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make
no statement to the police under any circumstances.” 37 Police officers tell their
children the same thing. 38
Limitless ways of persuading you to enter a contract are appropriate and
beneficial, but when a choice is plainly not in your interest, every means of
convincing you to make this choice requires force or deception—actual,
threatened, or implicit. To obtain cooperation and confessions in the postMiranda era, interrogating officers do just what they did before Miranda—
disparage, disbelieve, ridicule, and lie. They lie about the evidence, about the
power of their technology, about the seriousness of the crime, about the
usefulness of having a lawyer, about what could happen to the suspect if he
does not confess, and about what could happen to him if he does. 39 For the
most part, the courts let them do it. 40 Even when officers do not lie overtly,
their methods are intended to deceive. The routine use and approval of these
methods habituates the police to dishonesty and breeds community mistrust.
What Sissela Bok wrote after the experiences of Vietnam and Watergate seems
even more apropos today: “The veneer of social trust is often thin. As lies
spread . . . trust is damaged. Yet social trust is a social good to be
protected . . . . When it is damaged, the community as a whole suffers; and
when it is destroyed, societies falter and collapse.” 41
officers. Id. at 39-64.
37 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 516 n.12 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
38 See DUANE, supra note 36, at 3.
39 See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 493 (1977) (per curiam) (noting that the
police obtained a confession after falsely telling a suspect that his fingerprints had been
found at the scene of the crime); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 98 (1975) (noting that
the police obtained a confession after falsely telling a suspect that another suspect had
identified him as the gunman); Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in
Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425, 429-30 (1996) (describing other reported cases in
which the police obtained confessions by misrepresenting evidence).
40 See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (declaring, in a case in which an
officer claimed falsely that a suspect’s companion had confessed, that the officer’s lie,
“while relevant, is insufficient . . . to make this otherwise voluntary confession
inadmissible”); Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by
the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 777 (1997) (“[C]urrent constitutional doctrine . . . by and
large has acquiesced in, if not affirmatively sanctioned, police deception during the
investigative phase.”); Young, supra note 39, at 426 (“[T]he courts regularly admit
confessions obtained by police lying.”). But see People v. Thomas, 8 N.E.3d 308, 310 (N.Y.
2014) (ordering a confession excluded because police lies created a substantial risk of a
false confession).
41 SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 26-27 (1978). The
percentage of Americans who believed they could trust the federal government most of the
time fell from 77% before Vietnam and Watergate to 36% afterwards. It is 19% today. PEW
RESEARCH CTR., BEYOND DISTRUST: HOW AMERICANS VIEW THEIR GOVERNMENT (2015),
http://www.people-press.org/2015/11/23/1-trust-in-government-1958-2015/
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The no-penalty-for-silence decisions bar national, state, and local
governments from making cooperation advantageous, but these governments
employ thousands of people whose mission is to convince suspects that
cooperation will be advantageous. Our system of police interrogation relies on
deception, cajolery, and intimidation—nothing else. The defenders of Miranda
should ask themselves whether this is the system they want.
One alternative to this system is to reconsider Griffin and Miranda and
permit comment on silence. Advise a suspect that, although he need not speak,
his silence will be noted and may be considered as one circumstance
suggesting his guilt. With a forthright, moderate incentive for cooperation in
place, perhaps the deceptive stratagems could be abandoned. Perhaps
interrogation could occur, not in the backroom of a stationhouse, but before a
magistrate. Perhaps the civilized interrogation procedure that persisted for
almost three centuries in England pursuant to the Marian Committal Statute of
1555 42 could be restored. 43 With this procedure in place, outcomes would
depend less on the deviousness and skill of particular interrogators and on the
ignorance, foolishness, and vulnerability of particular suspects. I realize,
however, that righteous rhetoric on the part of both the hawks and the doves of
the criminal process probably makes this reform impossible.
The doves’ objection to replacing today’s deceptive psychological ploys
with an open incentive for speech is the Griffin-Miranda objection: Any visible
incentive is incompatible with the privilege, for it puts a price on silence. The
hawks’ objection is that comment would be less effective in producing
confessions than today’s backroom practices.
If the latter objection seemed persuasive, the appropriate response might be,

[https://perma.cc/F6YE-5H46].
42 2 & 3 Phil. & M. c. 10 (Eng.). A practice codified in Sir John Jervis’s Act 1848, 11 &
12 Vict. c. 42, § 18 (Eng.), effectively ended the Marian procedure. This statute required a
caution that an arrested person brought before a magistrate need not answer and that, if he
did answer, his answers could be used against him. Although the caution was intended to
advance the rights of people accused of crime, it backfired by leading to the development of
police interrogation. See COSMAS MOISIDIS, CRIMINAL DISCOVERY: FROM TRUTH TO PROOF
AND BACK AGAIN 19-21 (2008).
43 People whose names “read[] like an honor roll of the legal profession”—among them
Wigmore, Pound, Kauper, Friendly, Schaefer, and Frankel—have proposed a return to
something like the Marian procedure. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 345 n.5 (1978)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 98-99 (1980); WALTER V.
SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 76-81 (1967); Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth
Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968);
Paul G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused—A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30
MICH. L. REV. 1224 (1932); Roscoe Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or
Suspected of Crime, 24 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1014 (1934); John H. Wigmore, Nemo
Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 HARV. L. REV. 71, 85-88 (1891); see also Yale Kamisar,
Kauper’s “Judicial Examination of the Accused” Forty Years Later—Some Comments on a
Remarkable Article, 73 MICH. L. REV. 15 (1974).
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not to retain today’s deceptive methods, but to increase the incentive for
cooperation. Advise a suspect that revealing the truth as he sees it will lead to a
specified reduction in whatever sentence a court may impose if he is
convicted—say, a twenty percent reduction in a prison sentence and a
comparable reduction in any other sanction. 44 A magistrate might add that a
subsequent decision to plead guilty could lead to a further reduction of, say,
fifteen percent. 45 He might afford the suspect an opportunity to consult with
counsel about how to proceed. 46
Although drawing an adverse inference from silence did not trouble the
Framers of the Fifth Amendment, the proposal to reward cooperation with a
lighter sentence would have appalled them. Before the Constitution was
written, common law judges had established the rule that a confession obtained

44 Any suspect who tells the truth as he sees it should be entitled to the proposed
reduction in punishment. A sentencing judge might occasionally conclude that even a
suspect who denied his guilt and later was convicted at trial had told the truth as he
understood it. Bargaining for a confession rather than simply a truthful statement, like
bargaining for a guilty plea, is offensive; it assumes that the only correct answer is a
confession or, even worse, that the correct answer doesn’t matter. Bargaining for the
accused to tell the truth as he understands it is at least somewhat less troublesome.
Howe proposes a system for rewarding cooperation similar to the one suggested here, but
the one he proposes is more complicated. See Howe, supra note 2, at 948-61.
45 With forthright incentives for cooperation in place, perhaps two stains on American
criminal justice—stationhouse interrogation and prosecutorial plea bargaining—could both
be eradicated.
46 In England, Section 144 of the Criminal Justice Act of 2003 declares: “In determining
what sentence to pass on an offender who has pleaded guilty . . . , a court must take into
account . . . the stage in the proceedings at which the offender indicated his intention to
plead guilty . . . .” Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44, § 144 (Eng.). The Sentencing
Guidelines Council implemented this statute by recommending a scale of diminishing
discounts for guilty pleas. The scale ranges from a thirty-three percent discount when a
defendant pleads guilty at the earliest opportunity to a ten percent discount when he pleads
guilty on the day he appears for trial. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES COUNCIL, REDUCTION IN
SENTENCE FOR A GUILTY PLEA 6 (rev. 2007), http://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/Reduction_in_Sentence_for_a_Guilty_Plea_-Revised_2007.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7VGW-YQP6]; see also SENTENCING COUNCIL, REDUCTION IN SENTENCE
FOR
A
GUILTY
PLEA
GUIDELINE
CONSULTATION
5-6
(2016),
https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Reduction-in-sentence-for-aguilty-plea-consultation-paper-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/89N6-J6BA] (inviting comment on
a proposed revision of the current guideline).
In a six-month period in 2010 and 2011, eighty-seven percent of the defendants who were
sentenced in the Crown Court pleaded guilty. Sixty-four percent of the defendants who
pleaded guilty did so at the earliest opportunity, and thirty-five percent of those who pleaded
guilty had confessed to the police. See SENTENCING COUNCIL, CROWN COURT SENTENCING
SURVEY
21
(2011),
https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/CCSS_Experimental_Release_web.pdfcontent/uploads/CCSS_Experimenta
l_Release_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/A57X-4RLW].
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“by promises of favour” could not be received in evidence. 47
This rule persisted until after Miranda. The Supreme Court’s first coerced
confession decision, Hopt v. Utah, 48 said in 1884 that a confession, to be
voluntary, must be “uninfluenced by hope of reward or fear of punishment.” 49
In 1896, the Court declared a confession “inadmissible if made under any
threat, promise, or encouragement of any hope or favor.” 50 One year later, in
Bram v. United States, 51 the Court placed the common law rule on a
constitutional foundation: “[W]herever a question arises whether a confession
is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, commanding
that no person ‘shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.’” 52 The Court reiterated that a confession could not be received unless
it was “free and voluntary: that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats
or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight.” 53
Before Miranda, police and prosecutorial practice departed from this rule,
and after Miranda, the law changed. The Supreme Court abandoned Bram as a
standard for judging the voluntariness of guilty pleas in 1970 54 and as a
standard for judging the voluntariness of out-of-court confessions in 1991. 55
Today, as the Supreme Court observes, bargaining for guilty pleas is “not some
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.” 56 Our
courts have become fully dependent on a practice they once condemned as a
violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege. 57
47

R v. Warickshall (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (KB); R v. Rudd (1775) 98 Eng. Rep.
1114, 1116 (KB) (Mansfield, J.); see also State v. Bostick, 4 Del. (1 Harr.) 563, 564 (1845)
(“However slight the promise or threat may have been, the confession cannot be received.”).
48 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
49 Id. at 584.
50 Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 622 (1896).
51 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
52 Id. at 542 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
53 Id. at 542-43 (quoting 3 RUSSELL ON CRIMES 478 (Horace Smith & A.P.P. Keep eds.,
6th ed. 1896)).
Exhibit A in Miranda’s depiction of the unseemliness of in-custody interrogation was an
instruction manual co-authored by Fred Inbau. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436, 44855 (1966) (citing Inbau and Reid’s Criminal Interrogation and Confessions nine times).
Inbau, however, declared that he was “unalterably opposed” to “the use of force, threats, or
promises of leniency—all of which might well induce an innocent person to confess.” Fred
E. Inbau, Police Interrogation—A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 16,
16 (1961).
54 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 754 (1970).
55 See Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S. 279, 285 (1991) (declaring that Bram “does not
state the standard for determining the voluntariness of a confession”).
56 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott and William
J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
57 See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L.
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For almost fifty years, in hundreds of pages of law review articles, I have
decried plea bargaining, 58 but I have acknowledged that the practice is here to
stay. 59 When our justice system does not balk at using promises of leniency to
induce the ultimate act of self-incrimination—a plea of guilty—it need not be
squeamish about using similar leverage to induce suspects to say truthfully
what happened. Of course neither I nor other critics of plea bargaining ever
maintained that, rather than offer benefits in exchange for pleas of guilty,
prosecutors and judges should trick defendants into believing falsely that their
guilty pleas will be advantageous.
If one opposes both providing forthright incentives for cooperation and our
current regime of cajolery and deception, one alternative remains—shutting
down police interrogation. Our justice system could abandon altogether its
efforts to obtain evidence from criminal suspects and could require the
government to shoulder the entire load.
The trilemma, however, cannot be avoided. 60 The options are:
• A regime in which the prospect of comment on a suspect’s refusal to
speak and possibly a promised reduction in sentence supply
forthright reasons to speak;
• A regime in which suspects may be tricked into the false belief that
speaking will be advantageous—although they may not be tricked
too much; and
• A regime in which suspects may not be offered incentives to speak
and may not be tricked, leaving police interrogation with nothing to
do and ensuring that the government will almost never learn what
suspects have to say.
For fifty years, Miranda’s defenders, following the example of the Miranda
majority, have evaded this trilemma. 61 It is time to face up to it. A regime in
which police interrogation continues to serve a purpose although the police
may neither make silence costly nor convince people falsely that it will be
costly is an unreal dream.
II.

MIRANDA’S ETHICAL FAILURE: THE FLAWED MORALITY OF THE RIGHT TO

REV. 1 (1979).
58 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI.
L. REV. 50 (1968).
59 See Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering
Wound, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 673, 706 (2013) (“The time for a crusade to prohibit plea
bargaining has passed.”).
60 Cf. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (suggesting that “the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt” contributed to the development of the
privilege against self-incrimination).
61 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966) (“Confessions remain a proper
element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any
compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.”).
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REMAIN SILENT
The person who knows best whether a charge of crime is true is usually the
person charged with committing it. No legal system has failed to seek evidence
from the accused, and no sensible legal system ever would. Miranda’s
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment privilege, however, appears to rest on
the view that it is unseemly (and perhaps even inhuman) to encourage someone
accused of crime to reveal what he knows. Requiring the government to
shoulder the entire load is noble (and perhaps even thrilling).
This moral vision is upside down. As I’ve explained:
No parent or schoolteacher feels guilty about asking questions of a child
strongly suspected of misconduct. Similarly, no employer considers it
improper to ask an employee accused of wrongdoing to give his side of
the story. Criminal cases aside, there are apparently no investigative or
fact-finding proceedings in which asking questions and expecting
answers is regarded as dirty business. Noting that “parents try hard to
inculcate in their children the simple virtues of truth and responsibility,”
Justice Walter V. Schaefer once wrote that “the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination . . . runs counter to our ordinary
standards of morality.” 62
Defenders of the Griffin-Miranda perspective reject the analogy to
interrogation by private individuals: “[C]riminal defendants aren’t kids. A kid
who steals cookies might be sent to his room for an hour, but a criminal
defendant will be sent to a very small cell for a very long time.” 63 Because
criminal sanctions are usually (although not invariably) more severe than
private sanctions, it may be more difficult for a guilty suspect to speak the truth
and to accept the prescribed penalty than for a guilty child or employee to do
so. At the same time, however, someone who has committed a more serious
wrong than stealing cookies may have a greater moral obligation to do what he

62

Alschuler, supra note 15, at 2637 (quoting SCHAEFER, supra note 43, at 59). Justice
Schaefer might better have spoken of the right to remain silent than of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. When read simply as a prohibition of the use of torture,
imprisonment, and other harsh methods to induce self-incrimination, the Fifth Amendment
privilege does not run counter to ordinary morality. See Charles T. McCormick, Law and
the Future: Evidence, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 218, 222 (1956) (“[O]rdinary morality . . . sees
nothing wrong in asking a man, for adequate reason, about particular misdeeds of which he
has been suspected and charged.”). As Dean McCormick’s statement suggests, interrogation
intrudes upon privacy and, like a police search, should occur only upon a showing of
probable cause. See generally R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional
Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15 (1981). In the early seventeenth century, the maxim
nemo tenetur prodere seipsum apparently meant only that officials could not ask suspects to
respond under oath to incriminating questions without antecedent justification. Alschuler,
supra note 15, at 2640-41.
63 Myron Moskovitz, The O.J. Inquisition: A United States Encounter with Continental
Criminal Justice, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 1121, 1140 (1995).
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can to set things right.
Acknowledging one’s wrong is laudable, but of course it is also difficult.
The failure of guilty suspects and defendants to do what most others in their
situations would not do should not be punished criminally. The Fifth
Amendment accordingly provides that an accused who refuses to speak cannot
be imprisoned for contempt of court in the same way as other recalcitrant
witnesses. Nevertheless, a wrongdoer who confesses remains more virtuous
than one who does not. A suspect’s refusal to cooperate should not be
romanticized as something noble and should not be shielded from the
inferences that would be drawn from silence in other social situations. 64
The Supreme Court’s most recent decision on the right to remain silent,
Salinas v. Texas, 65 posed the ethical question nicely, but the Court gave an
equivocal answer. In Salinas, a suspect in a double homicide agreed to provide
his shotgun for ballistics testing and to submit to questioning in a police
interview room. Because the suspect was not formally in custody, Miranda’s
protections did not apply. He was not warned of his right to remain silent or his
right to counsel.
Through most of a one-hour interrogation, the suspect answered questions.
When, however, an officer asked whether his shotgun would “match the shells
recovered at the scene of the murder,” the suspect did not speak. Instead, he
“[l]ooked down at the floor, shuffled his feet, bit his bottom lip, cl[e]nched his
hands in his lap, [and] began to tighten up.” 66
A three-Justice plurality—Justices Alito and Kennedy and Chief Justice

64 The Miranda warnings themselves have muddied the issue. In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S.
610 (1976), the Supreme Court declared it “fundamentally unfair” to warn a suspect of his
right to remain silent and then to use the fact that he remained silent to impeach his
testimony. Id. at 618. According to the Court, the Miranda warnings convey an “implicit”
assurance that “silence will carry no penalty.” Id.
Similar unfairness may now exist whenever silence is used against a suspect. The
repetition of the Miranda warnings in countless films and television programs has made
Miranda “the most famous appellate case in the world.” Frederick Schauer, The Miranda
Warning, 88 WASH. L. REV. 155, 155 (2013). Miranda told everyone they have a right to
remain silent.
A revised warning, however, could make the absence of an estoppel clear: “You have a
right to remain silent, but your silence will be noted and may be considered as one
circumstance suggesting your guilt.” This warning would resemble the warning currently
given suspects in England and Wales: “You do not have to say anything. But it may harm
your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, something which you later rely on in
Court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.” Home Office, Police and Criminal
Evidence Act 1984: Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and Questioning of
Persons by Police Officers (Code C) ¶ 10.5 (rev. ed., effective May 2014). See generally
Craig M. Bradley, Interrogation and Silence: A Comparative Study, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 271
(2009).
65 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013).
66 Id. at 2178 (plurality opinion) (alteration in original).
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Roberts—supplied the decisive opinion. 67 This opinion declared the suspect’s
failure to answer admissible, but only because he had not invoked the privilege
against self-incrimination at the time he remained silent. 68 The plurality took
no position on whether the silence of a suspect who did invoke the privilege
would be admissible. 69
The Salinas ruling added another formality to the pile spawned by Miranda.
It favored suspects who had attended law school while demanding an
incantation few nonlawyer suspects would think of providing. Moreover, the
pleading it required served no significant function. 70 In Salinas, one did not
need this pleading to know the reason for the suspect’s silence: He feared that
his answer would incriminate him. It was only this fact that made his failure to
speak probative. 71
Two Justices—Justices Thomas and Scalia—would have held the suspect’s
failure to speak admissible even if he had invoked the privilege. 72 Four
dissenters—Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan—would have
excluded his failure to respond. 73
The dissenters’ position—as well as that of the Griffin and Miranda
majorities—was incongruous. If the suspect had responded to the question
about testing the shotgun and shells by saying either “Uh-oh” or “I’m sunk,”
his statement would have been admissible. If one assumes that the suspect’s
conduct—failing to respond, looking at the floor, biting his lip, clenching his
hands, and tightening up—was similarly probative (and it was 74), why did the

67

Id. at 2177.
Id. at 2184.
69 See id.
70 The plurality wrote that invocation of the privilege enables the government to “argue
that the testimony sought could not be self-incriminating or [to] cure any potential selfincrimination through a grant of immunity.” Id. at 2179 (citation omitted). Interrogating
officers, however, have no authority to approve immunity grants or to rule on the validity of
a claim of privilege. Moreover, unlike a judge, an officer who found a suspect’s claim of
privilege invalid could not order him to answer. A suspect not in custody may walk away
from an interview for any reason, just as a suspect who is in custody may decline to answer
for any reason.
71 See Tracey Maclin, The Right to Silence v. The Fifth Amendment, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 255, 281-82.
72 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (Thomas, J., concurring).
73 See id. at 2185 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
74 The probative value of silence varies greatly from one situation to another. A refusal to
respond to fishing-expedition inquiries—inquiries about one’s activities or whereabouts
posed without a showing of probable cause—may reflect only the belief that the answers are
none of the questioner’s business. Similarly, a refusal to submit at all to stationhouse
interrogation may not be very incriminating when this interrogation is likely to be prolonged
and deceptive, when it can easily produce inconsistencies that can be made to look
suspicious, and when even police officers tell their children to avoid it. Following a finding
of probable cause, however, a refusal to provide an account to a magistrate whose duty is to
68
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dissenters propose to treat this conduct differently?
Proclaiming that the suspect had a right to remain silent does not distinguish
his silence from his speech, for the suspect also had a right to speak. His right
to speak was in fact protected by the Constitution; prohibiting people from
admitting their crimes would violate the First Amendment. Would the
dissenters (or anyone else) argue that all confessions to the authorities must be
excluded because exercise of the right to speak cannot be made costly?
The Salinas dissenters said that, when asked about the shotgun and shells,
the suspect “fell silent.” 75 People can confess, however, by using gestures or
American Sign Language, and looking to the floor, biting one’s lip, and
refusing to answer can look a lot like a confession too. Under some
circumstances, suddenly falling silent can communicate much the same
message as the statement, “I’m sunk.” Especially when a refusal to answer is
accompanied by a revealing change in facial expression or body language or
by a sigh or a groan, no basis for drawing a line between silence and speech is
apparent. Why draw it? 76 What reason can there be for not treating all
communication—verbal and nonverbal—alike?
One may sympathize to a degree with the suspect in Salinas. If he had
understood his situation, he would not have submitted to stationhouse
interrogation at all. Although the police apparently did not lie to him, they
exploited his ignorance. Moreover, the suspect’s psychological state probably
was not greatly different from that of a suspect deemed by Miranda to have
been subjected to the inherently compelling pressures of in-custody
record but not challenge it is likely to be incriminating. And submitting to interrogation but
balking at a particular question may be highly incriminating. Of course, in almost every
situation, one can imagine reasons why an innocent suspect might decline to answer. In at
least some situations, however, the most likely explanation is that the sonofabitch is guilty.
Determining what weight, if any, to give to possibly incriminating circumstances is the role
of the jury.
75 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2185 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
76 Although Griffin forbids prosecutors from commenting on a defendant’s failure to
testify at trial, courts generally allow prosecutors to comment on a nontestifying defendant’s
demeanor. See, e.g., Borodine v. Douzanis, 592 F.2d 1202, 1210 (1st Cir. 1979) (“These
comments, when considered as a whole, were probably intended and understood as a
reflection on the defendant’s expressionless courtroom demeanor rather than on his right not
to take the stand.”); Bishop v. Wainright, 511 F.2d 644, 668 (5th Cir. 1975) (“We have
carefully reviewed prosecutor’s closing statements and understand them to be a comment
upon Bishop’s expressionless courtroom demeanor rather than upon his failure to take the
stand.” (footnote omitted)); Basora v. Mitchell, 803 F. Supp. 897, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(“[A]ny facial expressions one chooses to exhibit at trial are voluntary . . . .”); Brett H.
McGurk, Prosecutorial Comment on a Defendant’s Presence at Trial: Will Griffin Play in a
Sixth Amendment Arena, 31 UWLA L. REV. 207, 245-49 (2000); see also Emily Rebekkah
Hanks, Body Language: Should Physical Responses to Interrogation Be Admissible Under
Miranda?, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 89, 96-97 & n.34 (2003) (describing conflicting
rulings on the admissibility of body language and facial expressions when suspects decline
to answer).
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interrogation. Applying entirely different legal rules to his interrogation and,
especially, to his silence 77 gives too much weight to the magic words “under
arrest.” Any unfairness, however, would have been as great if the suspect had
expressed his distress verbally as it was when he expressed this distress
through nonverbal signs.
Admitting incriminating statements while excluding incriminating silence
does not remain neutral between silence and speech. It does not merely afford
suspects “a free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.” 78 It treats
suspects who remain silent more favorably than suspects who speak. Only a
glorification of noncooperation with the government can explain this tilt, and
glorifying noncooperation with a justified governmental inquiry is
backwards. 79

77

The Salinas plurality recognized that a suspect’s failure to answer an incriminating
question during custodial interrogation could not be received in evidence. In this situation,
whether the suspect had invoked his privilege against self-incrimination would not matter.
Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180 (plurality opinion). The reason, the plurality explained, is that a
suspect in custody “is subjected to the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ of an unwarned
custodial interrogation.” Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 & n.37
(1966)). A suspect who declines to answer, however, does not yield to the pressures of
custodial interrogation. He successfully resists these pressures. It is difficult to see why his
silence should be treated differently from that of the suspect in Salinas. See James J. Duane,
The Extraordinary Trajectory of Griffin v. California: The Aftermath of Playing Fifty Years
of Scrabble with the Fifth Amendment, 3 STAN. J. CRIM. L. & POL’Y 1, 10 n.52 (2015).
78 See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 496 (1967) (quoting Lisenba v. California,
314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941)).
79 A possible doctrinal response to the analysis in text is suggested by the alternate
rationale for the ruling in Griffin set forth supra in note 15. The Supreme Court might have
held in Griffin that using a suspect’s incriminating silence against him leaves him with no
way to avoid incriminating himself and thereby compels him to incriminate himself. A
suspect must speak or not speak, and either choice produces evidence that the prosecutor
may use to convict him. On this view, even if incriminating silence and incriminating
speech are indistinguishable, one or the other must be excluded. (Of course, if the privilege
demands only that a suspect have some way to avoid incriminating himself, the plurality
opinion in Salinas may supply it by allowing him to plead the Fifth Amendment privilege.)
This possible response focuses on doctrine, not on any normative issue. It rests on a
plausible reading of the word “compulsion,” but it does not suggest that tilting the scales in
favor of silence can be ethically justified. And when a plausible interpretation of the
constitutional text departs from both the Framers’ understanding of this text and ordinary
morality, it is probably not the best interpretation of this text. The Fifth Amendment
exempts people from criminal punishment and other harsh sanctions for refusing to
incriminate themselves because confession is difficult and cannot be expected. It does not
exempt them from punishment because silence is difficult. In fact, remaining silent is not
difficult; even dead people do it. The Framers of the Fifth Amendment meant to save people
from improper pressures to confess—pressures exerted by human beings. They did not
mean to save people from the “compulsion” to speak or not speak that arises simply from
the fact that speaking and not speaking are mutually exclusive.
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When legal doctrine departs from ordinary morality and forbids encouraging
the person who knows the most about his guilt or innocence to tell what he
knows, this doctrine is likely to be subverted. Police officers may use
deceptive or intimidating methods, and judges may wink. The flawed morality
of the expansive right to remain silent endorsed by Griffin and Miranda may
produce inexcusable mendacity in practice.
III. MIRANDA’S SECOND DOCTRINAL FAILURE: HYPERTECHNICAL NONSENSE
LAW
Salinas was only the most recent of many Supreme Court decisions to reject
the flawed morality of the right to silence in some situations while leaving this
flawed morality as the governing principle in other situations. As James Duane
has noted, fifty years of post-Miranda scrimmage among the Justices has
produced “a spectacularly chaotic farrago of opinions of such complexity that
only one practicing attorney in a thousand can accurately summarize them off
the top of her head.” 80 Seeking to harmonize these opinions “is as futile as
trying to make sense of the ‘story’ written in the words on a Scrabble board.” 81
Whether a suspect’s silence can be used now depends on whether he was or
was not in custody when he declined to speak, 82 whether he had or had not
received the Miranda warnings, 83 whether he did or did not invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination, 84 and whether the government seeks to use
his silence to establish his guilt, 85 impeach his testimony, 86 determine his
sentence, 87 or impose prison discipline. 88 Displaying the interaction of these
variables would require a chart with many boxes, a significant number of
which would remain blank.
Almost thirty years ago, Justice Holmes’s “bad man of the law” 89 and I co-

80

Duane, supra note 77, at 5.
Id. at 14.
82 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180 (plurality opinion).
83 See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611 (1976).
84 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (plurality opinion).
85 See id. at 2179.
86 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982).
87 See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 327-30 (1999) (holding that a defendant’s
silence may not be used at sentencing to draw an inference about his conduct but reserving
the question whether a defendant’s silence “bears upon the determination of a lack of
remorse, or upon acceptance of responsibility for purposes of the downward adjustment
provided in [sentencing guidelines]”).
88 See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316-19 (1976) (holding that silence may be
considered at a prison disciplinary hearing because this hearing is civil in nature).
89 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897)
(“If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares
only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a
good one, who finds his reasons for conduct . . . in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”).
81
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authored a police training manual. 90 It is time for a second edition:
When you have probable cause to arrest a suspect and wish to
interrogate him, do not arrest him. Ask him instead to accompany you to
the stationhouse for an interview. 91 If he agrees, you may question him
without providing warnings, and his answers will be admissible. His
failure to answer specific questions will also be admissible—unless he
invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. If the suspect refuses
your invitation, this refusal itself can be used as evidence of his guilt—
that is, unless he invokes the privilege against self-incrimination (which
he won’t). 92
If the suspect does not immediately agree to your proposal, tell him
that his refusal to speak with you may be treated as evidence of his guilt.
The controlling opinion in Salinas declared, “Petitioner worries that
officers could unduly pressure suspects into talking by telling them that
their silence could be used in a future prosecution. But as petitioner
himself concedes, police officers ‘have done nothing wrong’ when they
‘accurately stat[e] the law.’” 93
One possible difficulty with offering this advice is that a full and
accurate statement of the law would say more than the one the Supreme
Court appeared to approve. This statement would mention that the Court
has held a suspect’s silence admissible only if he fails to invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination. You do not want to tip your suspect
off to the possibility of invoking the privilege, but perhaps, as Salinas
implies, you can leave that detail out. The issue is murky enough that you
might want to consult your department’s legal advisor.
If, despite your accurate (though incomplete) legal advice, the suspect
still refuses an interview, place him under arrest. Do not, however, give
him the Miranda warnings. When the public safety requires it, you may
question him without warnings, and his answers will be admissible. 94 In
the absence of a special public need, however, you should not question
your arrested, unwarned suspect. (You need not be concerned that
For criticism of this view of the law, see ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES:
THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 132-80 (2000).
90 See Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1442-43 (1987).
91 Of course, if the suspect poses an immediate danger, it may be necessary to place him
under arrest. Before doing so, however, consider a possible alternative—asking him to agree
voluntarily to a search of his person and to being handcuffed voluntarily while you transport
him voluntarily to his voluntary interrogation. Cf. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 558-59 (1980) (concluding that an airline passenger transporting drugs in her
underwear consented voluntarily to a strip search).
92 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013) (plurality opinion).
93 Id. at 2183 (alteration in original).
94 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984).
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omitting the warnings might be unlawful. Miranda requires warnings
only when “a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation.” 95)
Your suspect probably will continue to remain silent, in which case you
will gain another piece of potentially useful evidence. Unlike the
suspect’s prearrest silence, his postarrest silence probably cannot be
introduced to show his guilt. 96 His silence will, however, be admissible to
impeach any defense he offers at trial. 97 Note that, if you had advised
your suspect of his rights, his postarrest silence would not be admissible
at all. 98 If your suspect does make a statement before you question him, it
will be a “volunteered” statement of the sort Miranda makes
admissible. 99
After an hour or two (during which your suspect will have provided
either a statement or another potentially useful period of silence), advise
him of his rights. If the suspect waives these rights, his statement will be
admissible. If he indicates that he wishes to remain silent, you may, if you
like, cease your interrogation, repeat the Miranda warnings at a later
time, and try again. Although Miranda says that all interrogation must
cease when a suspect invokes the right to remain silent, 100 it does not say
that questioning must cease forever. 101 If the suspect tells you that he
wishes to consult a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court forbids trying
again. Interrogation must cease until counsel has been made available or
the suspect himself initiates a conversation without prompting. 102
95

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
A dictum in Salinas seems to say so. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180 (plurality
opinion). Before Salinas, however, the issue was unsettled. Compare United States v.
Frazier, 394 F.3d 612, 619-20 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding postarrest, prewarning silence
admissible as part of the prosecutor’s case-in-chief but recognizing that the authorities were
conflicting and that the Supreme Court had not addressed the issue), with United States v.
Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that postarrest, prewarning silence
cannot be received as part of the prosecutor’s case-in-chief).
97 See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982).
98 See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611 (1976).
99 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 (“Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by
the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.”).
100 See id. at 473-74 (“If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this
point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement
taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion,
subtle or otherwise.” (footnote omitted)).
101 See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102-03 (1975).
102 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981); see also Arizona v. Robertson,
486 U.S. 675, 683-85 (1988) (holding renewed interrogation impermissible even when the
interrogating officer does not know that the suspect has requested counsel and when this
officer is investigating a crime other than the one investigated at the time of the suspect’s
request for counsel).
96
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Providing a lawyer would shut down questioning, however, so
disregard both the Supreme Court’s ruling and your suspect’s request.
Continue to question him in the absence of counsel. Although the
prosecutor will be unable to introduce as part of the state’s case-in-chief
any statement the suspect makes, his statement will become admissible to
impeach his testimony if he later takes the witness stand to say something
different from what he told you. 103 Indeed, if the suspect’s testimony on
direct examination fails to contradict his earlier statement, the prosecutor
may cross-examine him about the facts reported in the earlier statement
and may introduce this statement if the suspect fails to confirm what he
said to you. 104 Moreover, if the suspect says something that leads to the
discovery of incriminating physical evidence, this evidence will be
admissible, not only for purposes of impeachment, but also to prove the
suspect’s guilt. 105
Do not, however, place too much pressure on your suspect. If a court
holds his statement involuntary under pre-Miranda standards, it will be
inadmissible for any purpose. In addition, whatever physical evidence
you uncover by questioning the suspect will be excluded. The Supreme
Court has said that pre-Miranda voluntariness standards are part of the
“real” Constitution; Miranda is part of the “just pretend” Constitution. 106
Litigation following Miranda has focused not only on the issues noted in the
Bad Man Training Manual but also on linguistic questions—how warnings of
rights, waivers of rights, and invocations of rights must be phrased. The
Supreme Court has concluded that, although warnings of rights may depart
from the formula set forth in Miranda 107 and although waivers of rights can be
implied, 108 invocations of rights must be unambiguous. 109

103

See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1975).
See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626-28 (1980).
105 See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643 (2004) (“Introduction of the
nontestimonial fruit of a voluntary statement, such as respondent’s Glock, does not
implicate the Self-Incrimination Clause.”). The testimonial fruit of a voluntary statement
obtained in violation of Miranda, however, sometimes must be excluded. See Missouri v.
Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 617 (2004).
106 Compare Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (“The Miranda exclusionary
rule . . . may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation.”), and
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (finding that Miranda’s safeguards are “not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution”), with Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428, 432 (2000) (“We hold that Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may
not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress . . . .”).
107 See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202-04 (1989) (upholding a revised version
of the Miranda warnings five-to-four).
108 See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373-76 (1979).
109 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010) (“There is good reason to
require an accused who wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent to do so
104
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Litigation also has focused on what constitutes custody 110 and what
constitutes interrogation. According to the Court, the applicable definition of
interrogation depends on whether the suspect has appeared before a magistrate.
Before his appearance, the standard is objective—whether an officer either
asked an express question or used words or actions “reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response.” 111 After a suspect’s appearance, the standard
becomes subjective—whether the officer “deliberately elicited” an
incriminating response. 112 The reason for the shift is that a suspect’s right to
counsel during interrogation before his first appearance in court is derived
from the Fifth Amendment, while his right to counsel during any interrogation
that occurs thereafter is afforded by the Sixth Amendment. According to the
Court, “the policies underlying the two constitutional protections are quite
distinct.” 113
Miranda’s defenders attribute fifty years of Dickensian distinctions to the
failure of the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts to follow Miranda
faithfully, and they view every departure from the broadest reading of Miranda
as faithlessness. Much of their criticism is in fact justified, but it was Miranda
that began the elaboration of today’s Ptolemaic system. Whatever its defects,
the law of confessions that preceded Miranda focused on ethically salient
issues. Miranda’s artificial rules invited artificial limitations. Nonsense yields
nonsense.
IV. MIRANDA’S THIRD DOCTRINAL FAILURE: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL THAT
WASN’T
Miranda declares that a suspect in custody “must be warned prior to any
questioning . . . that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if
he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.” 114 Although a suspect who hears this warning
may request counsel, he will not get one. The reason is not that officers follow
the Bad Man Training Manual and interrogate suspects who have requested
counsel in the absence of counsel. The reason is instead that, rather than
provide counsel, interrogating officers surrender. They cease their efforts to

unambiguously.”); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (“[T]he suspect must
unambiguously request counsel.”).
110 See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 265 (2011) (holding five-to-four
that a suspect’s youth may be considered in deciding whether a reasonable person in his
situation would have believed himself free to depart).
111 See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
112 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964); see also Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 400 (1977).
113 Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 n.4. Unfortunately, the Court did not explain how the policies
differ or why they require two definitions of interrogation.
114 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).

874

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:849

question suspects and thereby comply fully with Miranda. 115 Almost every
police officer in America understands that providing a lawyer for a suspect
simply so that the lawyer can tell the suspect to shut up is pointless. It is easier
for the officer to shut down interrogation himself. A suspect who hopes to see
a lawyer and to answer questions is in for a surprise. 116
Supreme Court Justices, however, are not as smart as police officers. The
Miranda Court described the interrogations of the future just as though lawyers
were going to be there. After observing that counsel’s presence would protect
the Fifth Amendment privilege, it declared:
The presence of counsel at the interrogation may serve several significant
subsidiary functions as well. If the accused decides to talk to his
interrogators, the assistance of counsel can mitigate the dangers of
untrustworthiness. With a lawyer present the likelihood that the police
will practice coercion is reduced, and if coercion is nevertheless exercised
the lawyer can testify to it in court. The presence of a lawyer can also
help to guarantee that the accused gives a fully accurate statement to the
police and that the statement is rightly reported by the prosecution at
trial. 117
The right to counsel afforded by Miranda is not a right to counsel. It is an
incantation that suspects can use to shut down questioning. 118 Most suspects,
115 Within ill-defined limits, the police may discourage a suspect who has not yet
requested counsel unambiguously from making the request. See Welsh S. White, Deflecting
a Suspect from Requesting an Attorney, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 29, 31 (2006) (noting that
federal decisions appear to give the police “extraordinarily wide leeway to employ
interrogation tactics that deflect suspects from requesting an attorney during a custodial
interrogation”).
116 The revised Miranda warning the Supreme Court upheld five-to-four in Duckworth v.
Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989), was less misleading than the warning prescribed by Miranda
itself:
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have the right
to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have a right to
talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you
during questioning. You have this right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if
you cannot afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be
appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. If you wish to answer
questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering questions
at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you’ve talked to
a lawyer.
Id. at 198.
117 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470.
118 Of course Miranda previously had given suspects another incantation they could use
to shut down questioning. They could say that they wished to shut down questioning. There
was no reason for the Court to provide a second incantation to do the same thing. (“If you
do not wish to answer questions, you may say either ‘I wish to remain silent’ or
‘Alakazam.’”) The Miranda majority evidently believed that the second incantation would
be more than a device for shutting down questioning. They believed it would cause a lawyer
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however, do not say the magic words. As noted above, more than threequarters of all suspects under police interrogation waive their Miranda
rights. 119
The Miranda Court’s discussion of the ability of warnings to safeguard
constitutional rights was contradictory. For people who wondered why lawyers
were needed to advise suspects of the right to remain silent after the warnings
themselves had advised suspects of this right, the Court had an answer: “Our
aim is to assure that the individual’s right to choose between silence and
speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process. A once-stated
warning, delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself
suffice to that end among those who most require knowledge of their
rights.” 120 Under Miranda, however, the only advice suspects receive before
waiving both the right to remain silent and the right to counsel is a “oncestated warning, delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation.” The
Court gave suspects no other protection despite its acknowledgement that a
once-stated warning is ineffective.
Charles Ogletree proposed to remedy this deficiency by allowing suspects to
waive counsel only after consulting counsel. 121 The question that ought to
precede any discussion of the existence or scope of the right to counsel,
however, is what task one wants counsel to perform. Both Ogletree and the
Miranda majority presumably wanted lawyers to do what Justice Jackson said
any lawyer worth his salt would do—“tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to
make no statement to police under any circumstances.” 122 As just about every
to appear, as if from an old oil lamp. Why the majority imagined the police would go to the
trouble of providing lawyers to halt questioning when the police could halt questioning
themselves is a mystery. Although the two incantations provided by the Court are identical
in function, the Court has elaborated supposed differences between them. It seems that the
words “I wish to see a lawyer” say “Please do not question me” much more forcefully than
the words “I wish to remain silent.” Compare Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), with
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
119 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
120 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469.
121 Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to
Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1842 (1987); see also Lawrence S. Leiken,
Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47 DENV. L.J. 1, 46-51
(1970) (proposing a nonwaivable right to counsel during interrogation). Shortly after
Miranda, officers of the ACLU objected that “a person must have the advice of counsel in
order to intelligently waive the assistance of counsel.” See Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the
Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the New Fifth Amendment and the Old Voluntariness
Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59, 67 n.47 (1966); see also Brief for the American Civil Liberties
Union as Amicus Curiae at 3, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 759) (“A
police warning of the suspect’s right to remain silent is not adequate. Neither is the granting
of prior access to counsel, as distinguished from the presence of counsel. . . . Effectuation of
the privilege against self-incrimination, in these circumstances, requires the providing of
counsel to all.”).
122 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in part and
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police officer in America understands, however, the government can shut
down interrogation without bringing lawyers to the stationhouse to do it.
Miranda’s defenders should recognize that the goals of ensuring that foolish
suspects do not talk and of ending police interrogation go hand in hand, for
only foolish suspects do talk. There are more efficient ways of accomplishing
these goals than employing professionals with graduate degrees to say “shut up
and I mean it” to millions of suspects one by one. 123
V.

MIRANDA’S JURISPRUDENTIAL FAILURE: ABANDONING THE JUDICIAL
ROLE

The principal mission of courts is the rectification of past wrongs—what
Aristotle called corrective justice. 124 Someone who alleges a legal wrong can
go to court, and the court will listen. It will decide whether the allegation is
true and, if it is, what should be done about it. Courts focus on disputes about
the past.
The principal mission of legislatures is to enact rules for the future. Where
courts look backwards, legislatures look forward. The line between the past
and the future marks the basic division of labor between the judicial and
legislative branches of government.
The Framers of the Constitution understood this distribution of
responsibilities. They forbade Congress from enacting ex post facto laws, 125
bills of attainder, 126 and other retrospective measures 127 while limiting federal
courts to the resolution of cases and controversies—disputes about past
events. 128
dissenting in part).
123 One possibility might be to revise the Miranda warnings to say: “You have a right to
remain silent, and, if you hope for a favorable resolution of your case, it would be very
foolish for you to say anything about your past conduct to me, any other law enforcement
officer, or anyone with whom you may speak in jail. I’ll say it again: It would be very dumb
for you to talk. If, however, you are remorseful about a past wrong and wish to accept
whatever punishment a court may impose, I will be happy to listen and take down whatever
you have to say.” Reading the Constitution to require this warning or to require a direct
shutdown of interrogation, however, might be difficult. Affording a nonwaivable right to
counsel would be a strange and wasteful way of bringing about the same end, but it might be
less of a doctrinal stretch.
124 ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, ch. 4, at 111, 114-17 (David Ross
trans., Oxford University Press rev. ed. 1925) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
125 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
126 Id.
127 Id. art. I, § 10 (Contracts Clause); id. amend. V (Due Process and Takings Clauses).
128 Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Of course the division of responsibility between courts and legislatures is inexact, and a
court need not turn a blind eye to how its resolution of disputes about the past will affect
future conduct. In a commercial case, for example, it may favor a clear rule in order to
facilitate future transactions. Although no formula marks the extent to which courts should
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Impatient reformers and moral skeptics have been uncomfortable with this
traditional allocation of duties. Some skeptics in fact reject the very concept of
corrective justice. Judge Posner wrote this about Justice Cardozo:
Legal rules should be viewed in instrumental terms. [In Cardozo’s
words:] “Few rules in our time are so well established that they may not
be called upon any day to justify their existence as means adapted to an
end.” The instrumental concept of law breaks with Aristotle’s influential
theory of corrective justice. The function of law as corrective justice is to
restore an equilibrium, while in Cardozo’s account “not the origin, but the
goal, is the main thing. There can be no wisdom in the choice of a path
unless we know where it will lead. . . . The final principle of selection for
judges . . . is one of fitness to an end.” 129
From a pragmatic or utilitarian perspective, the measure of a judicial
decision appears to be how it will affect the entire world (or perhaps just a
single nation or society) for good or ill. This viewpoint makes the litigants
before the court unimportant, for these litigants constitute a small portion of
the world. The pragmatic perspective also wipes out the core distinction
between courts and legislatures.
The decline of corrective justice (or, if you prefer, the fading of the idea of
courts) preceded Miranda and persisted after this decision. 130 Miranda,
however, remains history’s most stunning example of legislative opinion
writing. 131
Most of the Miranda opinion was devoted to “delineating” a “system” for
protecting the privilege against self-incrimination. 132 When judges delineate a
system rather than decide a case, the distinction between dictum and holding
does not seem to matter, 133 and the facts of the cases before the court do not
seem to matter either. In Miranda, the Court mentioned these facts almost as
an afterthought—at the end of its opinion and only briefly. Only one fact
counted, and it was one that all four of the cases before the Court had in
common: no police officer in any of these cases had read the mind of Chief
Justice Warren and complied with the rules the Court brought into existence a
consider the future as well as the past, a court’s primary responsibility is always to render
justice to the parties before it. A court that concentrates only on governing the future should
no longer be called a court.
129 RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 391 (1995) (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98, 102-03 (1921)).
130 See ALSCHULER, supra note 89, at 100-03.
131 See generally Henry J. Friendly, A Postscript on Miranda, in 1 HENRY J. FRIENDLY,
BENCHMARKS 266 (1967); Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal
Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929 (1965).
132 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) (referring to “the system we
delineate today”).
133 For example, Miranda proclaimed a suspect’s silence inadmissible although none of
the defendants in the cases before the Court had remained silent. See id.
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few pages before it set the defendants’ convictions aside. 134
A court that sees its job as providing retrospective justice should rarely have
occasion to apply a ruling only prospectively. 135 One week after Miranda,
however, the Supreme Court announced that its decision would apply
prospectively in the same way most statutes do. 136 Miranda ordered the
convictions of the four defendants whose cases were before the Court set aside,
but the seventy-five or so other defendants who had sought the Court’s review
of apparently identical issues were out of luck. They not only were denied
Supreme Court review but also could not obtain relief elsewhere. 137
Not long after Miranda, the Court said that its failure to treat like cases alike
was
an unavoidable consequence of the necessity that constitutional
adjudications not stand as mere dictum. Sound policies of decisionmaking, rooted in the command of Article III of the Constitution that we
resolve issues solely in concrete cases or controversies, and in the
possible effect upon the incentive of counsel to advance contentions
requiring a change in the law, militate against denying [the parties before
the Court] the benefit of [the Court’s] decisions. Inequity arguably results
from according the benefit of a new rule to the parties in the case in
which it is announced but not to other litigants similarly situated in the
trial or appellate process who have raised the same issue. But we regard

134 Note that, unlike Joseph Grano, I do not contend that the Constitution prohibits
federal courts from articulating prophylactic rules applicable in state courts—rules
forbidding conduct by state officers that does not itself violate the Constitution in order to
make more effective the Constitution’s prohibition of other conduct. See Joseph D. Grano,
Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U.
L. REV. 100, 123-29 (1985). In my view, David Strauss offered a convincing reply to Grano.
See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 191-95
(1988); see also David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 958, 961-66 (2001).
135 For an illustration of a prospective ruling that I regard as appropriate, see State v.
Hobson, 577 N.W.2d 825, 838 (Wis. 1998) (recognizing the unfairness of denying the
common law privilege to use force to resist an unlawful arrest to a defendant who might
have relied on this privilege, but abrogating the privilege prospectively because an unlawful
arrest was no longer likely to lead to lengthy confinement in unhealthy conditions and
because less violent means of challenging the legality of an arrest had become available).
136 See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733 (1966). It was only a year before
Miranda that the Court first announced that one of its decisions would apply only
prospectively. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 640 (1965) (declaring that the ruling
in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), would apply only prospectively); see also Tehan v.
Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 419 (1966) (declaring that the ruling in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965), would apply only prospectively).
137 See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 255 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[I]t was
sheer coincidence that those precise four were chosen. Any other single case in the group or
any other four would have been sufficient for our purposes.”).
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the fact that the parties involved are chance beneficiaries as an
insignificant cost for adherence to sound principles of decisionmaking. 138
For the Miranda Court, sound principles of decision-making did not require
the even-handed administration of corrective justice. They required selecting a
few litigants at random to provide trimmings for the Court’s legislative rulings.
Denying relief to other, similarly situated defendants did not deprive these
other defendants of anything to which they were entitled, for even the
defendants whose convictions were set aside had no claim to this relief as a
matter of corrective justice. The reversal of their convictions was simply a
payoff to them for bringing legislative issues before the Court. Undeserved
payoffs for a few “chance beneficiaries” were in fact required by the
Constitution. In Miranda itself, setting aside the convictions of one rapist
(Ernesto Miranda), two robbers (Michael Vignera and Carl Calvin Westover),
and one murderer (Roy Allen Stewart) was “an insignificant cost for adherence
to sound principles of decision-making.” 139
A court that assumes the legislative role is unlikely to do it well. Apart from
its inability to gather information independently, its lack of authority to order
expenditures from the public treasury, and other institutional limitations, a
court is constrained by the need to pretend to be a court. Tying solutions to
legal doctrine limits its options and is likely to produce clunky, second-best
reforms—for example, providing lawyers to say “shut up and I mean it” to
millions of suspects one by one.
The Miranda Court underscored the legislative character of its ruling by
inviting real legislatures, state and federal, to amend or abandon it:
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting
the privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the
exercise of their creative rule-making capacities. Therefore we cannot say
that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular
solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is

138

Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967).
Id. Justice Harlan protested that the Court could free a convicted criminal only when
“the government has offended constitutional principle in the conduct of his case. And when
another similarly situated defendant comes before us, we must grant the same relief or give
a principled reason for acting differently.” Desist, 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan recognized, however, that whether a prisoner may invoke the equitable
remedy of habeas corpus to obtain relief on the basis of a recently announced rule is a
different question from whether the new rule must be applied retroactively. Id. at 260-69.
In 1989, the Supreme Court abandoned the view of retroactivity it took at the time of
Miranda and endorsed Justice Harlan’s position. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 303-10
(1989) (declaring that a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure must be applied to all
untried cases and all cases on trial or direct review when the rule is announced but that, with
rare exceptions, a new procedural rule does not entitle prisoners whose convictions were
final at the time it was announced to habeas corpus relief).
139
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presently conducted. Our decision in no way creates a constitutional
straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended
to have this effect. We encourage Congress and the States to continue
their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the
rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our
criminal laws. However, unless we are shown other procedures which are
at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence
and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
safeguards must be observed. 140
In the fifty years since Miranda, neither Congress nor any state legislature
has accepted the Supreme Court’s invitation to devise an alternate procedure
for protecting the right to remain silent. Creating a procedure “at least as
effective” as Miranda’s would not take much. For example, a legislature could
require a police officer to wave a wet noodle in the direction of Mecca.
VI. MIRANDA’S EMPIRICAL FAILURE: MISSION UN-ACCOMPLISHED
As noted above, more than three-quarters of the suspects advised of their
Miranda rights waive them, and, when they do, the police question them just
as they did before Miranda. 141 There is no reason to believe that Miranda has
significantly changed the lives of these suspects or made the police less
effective in securing incriminating statements from them. In Paul Cassell and
Bret Hayman’s study of felony cases screened by Salt Lake County
prosecutors, fifty-four percent of the suspects who waived their Miranda rights
gave incriminating statements to the police. 142 In Richard Leo’s study of 182
directly observed or recorded interrogations in California, seventy-six percent
of the suspects who waived their Miranda rights made incriminating
statements. 143
It seems doubtful that many of the suspects who invoke their Miranda rights
would have provided incriminating statements in the absence of Miranda. In
Leo’s study, ninety-five percent of the suspects who invoked their rights had
previously been convicted of crimes, and eighty-two percent had previously

140

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
142 Cassell and Hayman did not supply this figure directly. They reported, however, that
108 suspects waived their Miranda rights and that fifty-eight suspects subjected to custodial
interrogation provided incriminating statements. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 32, at 860
tbl.3, 869 tbl.4. Five of the 108 suspects who initially waived their rights invoked them
during interrogation, but two of these suspects already had made incriminating statements.
Id. at 860. Whether the five suspects who withdrew their initial waivers are included or
excluded from the calculus, the figure in text remains the same.
143 See Leo, supra note 32, at 280-81 (“If we exclude from my sample those cases in
which the police terminated questioning upon the invocation of a Miranda right (and thus
the detective or detectives made no effort to incriminate the suspect), more than threefourths (76%) of the interrogations I observed produced a successful result.”).
141
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been convicted of felonies. 144 It probably was not Miranda that made these
tough, experienced suspects uncooperative. 145
The Miranda dissenters accused the Supreme Court majority of “taking a
real risk with society’s welfare.” 146 They declared that the Court’s decision
would “measurably weaken the ability of the criminal law to perform [its
basic] tasks,” 147 and they added, “In some unknown number of cases the
Court’s rule will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets and to
the environment which produced him, to repeat his crime whenever it pleases
him.” 148 Neither Miranda nor any other Warren Court decision, however, has
kept the United States from imprisoning a higher proportion of its population
than any other nation in the world except the Republic of Seychelles. 149
Contrary to Richard Nixon’s influential claim shortly after Miranda, neither
Miranda nor any other Warren Court decision has notably weakened “the
peace forces as against the criminal forces.” 150
That the overwhelming majority of suspects advised of their rights waive
them and submit to stationhouse interrogation tells you all you need to know
about Miranda’s empirical effect. One scholar, however, Paul Cassell, has
published several hundred law-review pages in an effort to show that “Miranda
has significantly harmed law enforcement efforts in this country.” 151 He has
144

Id. at 287 tbl.9. Of the suspects who waived their rights, eighty-four percent had been
convicted of crimes, and fifty-three percent had been convicted of felonies. Id. Viewing the
data from a different perspective, Leo comments, “[A] suspect with a felony record in my
sample was almost four times as likely to invoke his Miranda rights as a suspect with no
prior record and almost three times as likely to invoke as a suspect with a misdemeanor
record.” Id. at 286. If Miranda sought to redress the disparity between experienced,
sophisticated suspects and naïve first-timers, it failed. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note
32, at 859.
145 See Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators’
Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 469
(1999) (“Taken as a group, suspects who assert their Miranda rights may be unlikely to
make incriminating statements to the police under any circumstances, because they have
been hardened by exposure to the criminal justice system.”).
146 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 517 (1966) (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart and
White, JJ., dissenting).
147 Id. at 541 (White, J., joined by Harlan and Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
148 Id. at 542.
149 See ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 2 (11th ed. 2015),
http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/world_prison_populati
on_list_11th_edition_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/GSD6-LKVP] (“The countries with the highest
prison population rate—that is, the number of prisoners per 100,000 of the national
population—are Seychelles (799 per 100,000), followed by the United States (698), St. Kitts
& Nevis (607), Turkmenistan (583), U.S. Virgin Islands (542), Cuba (510), El Salvador
(492), Guam – U.S.A. (469), Thailand (461), Belize (449), Russian Federation (445),
Rwanda (434) and British Virgin Islands (425).”).
150 Richard Nixon, What Has Happened to America?, READER’S DIG., Oct. 1967, at 50.
151 Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L.
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relied on three sets of data. 152
In his first paper on the subject, Cassell reviewed before-and-after studies of
Miranda’s impact. As Richard Leo has noted, all of these studies were “replete
with methodological weaknesses.” 153 Most but not all, however, indicated that
the police obtained fewer confessions following Miranda than they did before.
Averaging the confession-reduction rates shown by some of these studies and
estimating on the basis of other studies how often a confession is needed to
obtain a conviction, Cassell concluded that Miranda caused a loss of 3.8% of
the convictions of the suspects whom the police interrogated prior to
Miranda. 154
Stephen Schulhofer responded in sixty-three pages to Cassell’s 117-page
analysis. He summarized his criticism this way:
[I]nconsistent . . . procedures are necessary to bring Miranda’s supposed
attrition effect up to Cassell’s 3.8% figure. . . . [A]t critical points in his
analysis, data are cited selectively, sources are quoted out of context,
weak studies showing negative impacts are uncritically accepted, and
small methodological problems are invoked to discredit a no-harm
conclusion when the same difficulties are present—to an even greater
extent—in the negative-impact studies that Cassell chooses to feature. If
we accept Cassell’s premise that the old studies are relevant, . . . we find
that the properly adjusted attrition rate is not 3.8% but at most only

REV. 387, 390 (1996) [hereinafter Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs]; see also Paul G.
Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda’s Defenders, 90 NW. U. L.
REV. 1084 (1996) [hereinafter Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs]; Paul G. Cassell & Richard
Fowles, Falling Clearance Rates After Miranda: Coincidence or Consequence, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1181 (1998); Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops?: A ThirtyYear Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1055 (1998) [hereinafter Cassell & Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops]; Paul G. Cassell,
Miranda’s “Negligible” Effect on Law Enforcement: Some Skeptical Observations, 20
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 327 (1997) [hereinafter Cassell, Miranda’s “Negligible” Effect on
Law Enforcement]; Cassell & Hayman, supra note 32; Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles,
Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review of Fifty Years of Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s
Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 B.U. L. REV. _[PAGE]__(2017) [hereinafter
Cassell & Fowles, Still Handcuffing]; Paul G. Cassell, The Costs of the Miranda Mandate: A
Lesson in the Dangers of Inflexible, “Prophylactic” Supreme Court Inventions, 28 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 299 (1996).
152 Readers uninterested in empirical studies that appear to have persuaded few scholars
other than their authors may wish to skip the remainder of this Ssection and proceed to the
conclusion of this Article at page [PINCITE].
153 Richard Angelo Leo, Police Interrogation in America: A Study of Violence, Civility,
and Social Change 334 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California,
Berkeley), quoted in Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits
and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 507 (1996).
154 Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs, supra note 151, at 437-38.
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0.78%. 155
Cassell replied to Schulhofer. 156 In my view, Schulhofer had the better of
the argument on most points but not all. 157 The rate of lost convictions among
155

Schulhofer, supra note 153, at 502 (emphasis in original).
Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs, supra note 151.
157 Cassell gave no credence to a study by the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office
indicating that confession rates did not fall after Miranda and in fact increased significantly.
Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs, supra note 151, at 414-16 (describing the weaknesses of
the Los Angeles study). Schulhofer gave no credence to a study by the Manhattan District
Attorney’s office indicating a substantially greater decline in confession rates than that
reported by any other study. Schulhofer, supra note 153, at 517-24 (describing the
weaknesses of the Manhattan study). The scholars’ treatment of these two studies appeared
to explain most of the difference in their conclusions, and, in my view, neither of the studies
was useful. Cassell appropriately disregarded the Los Angeles study, and Schulhofer
appropriately disregarded the Manhattan study.
The principal difficulty with the Los Angeles study was that it did not compare
confession rates after Miranda with confession rates in the period before the police began to
advise suspects of their right to remain silent and their right to counsel. One year before
Miranda, in People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361 (Cal. 1965), the California Supreme Court
required interrogating officers to give these warnings. Id. at 370-71. The Los Angeles study
compared confession rates after Dorado with confession rates after Miranda. Cassell
appropriately observed that the study was, not a “before-and-after” study, but an “after-andafter” study. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs, supra note 151, at 416.
Schulhofer in fact acknowledged this deficiency. He nevertheless credited the study
because Cassell himself proposed to provide some warnings to suspects rather than simply
resurrect pre-Miranda law. Schulhofer maintained that the baseline for evaluating
Miranda’s costs should be the regime that Cassell would substitute for Miranda rather than
the regime that preceded this decision. Schulhofer, supra note 153, at 534-35. When
considering what costs, if any, Miranda generated historically, however, the Los Angeles
study is unhelpful, as Schulhofer recognized.
A further defect of the Los Angeles study was that the questionnaire provided to assistant
district attorneys about their pre-Miranda cases apparently asked about “confessions and
admissions” while the questionnaire provided after Miranda asked about “confession[s],
admission[s] or other statement[s].” Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs, supra note 151, at 41516. Following his exchange with Schulhofer, Cassell discovered that Stephen Trott, a U.S.
Circuit Judge, had compiled the Los Angeles data years earlier when he worked as a law
clerk in the District Attorney’s Office. Although Trott’s superiors insisted on presenting the
data he compiled, Trott’s view was that these data “ended up measuring apples and oranges”
and “prove[d] nothing.” Cassell, Miranda’s “Negligible” Effect on Law Enforcement, supra
note 151, at 331-32.
The principal defect of the Manhattan study that Schulhofer disregarded was that it might
have shown the effect of the Supreme Court’s ruling on Miranda’s retroactivity rather than
the effect of Miranda itself. This study consisted of District Attorney Frank Hogan’s
testimony to Congress concerning confessions in nonhomicide felony cases presented to the
grand jury in the six months before Miranda and the six months after. According to Hogan,
confessions were noted in forty-nine percent of the cases presented during the pre-Miranda
period but in only fifteen percent of the cases presented thereafter. Controlling Crime
156
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interrogated suspects in the period immediately following Miranda probably
was more than 0.78% but less than 3.8%. 158 A more precise number does not
seem worth pursuing.
In a second paper, Cassell and a student co-author, Bret Hayman, examined
the cases of 219 suspects screened by the district attorney in Salt Lake
County. 159 These cases included cases in which suspects were not questioned,
cases in which suspects were not under arrest and so were questioned without
warnings, and even cases in which the suspects’ whereabouts were unknown.
Cassell and Hayman reported that 33.3% (73) of the 219 suspects provided
incriminating statements. 160 According to the authors, the “evidence suggests
that interrogations were successful, very roughly speaking, in about 55% to
60% of interrogations conducted before the Miranda decision.” 161 Their
conclusion was: “Our 33.3% overall success rate (and even our 42.2%
questioning success rate) is well below the 55%-60% estimated pre-Miranda
rate and, therefore, is consistent with the hypothesis that Miranda has harmed
the confession rate.” 162
In his contribution to this Symposium, Cassell, writing with a different coThrough More Effective Law Enforcement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 1120 (1967).
The Supreme Court held in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), that Miranda
would apply only prospectively. Id. at 733. Defendants whose trials had begun on or before
the day of the Miranda decision were entitled to no relief, but Miranda’s requirements
would apply in trials that started after that date. The effect of this ruling was to make nearly
all confessions obtained prior to Miranda inadmissible when the confessing suspects’ trials
had not begun. Lacking clairvoyant powers, police officers had not complied with the
Supreme Court’s warning and waiver requirements until the Court revealed what they were.
Cases presented to the Manhattan grand jury in the six months after Miranda were likely to
have included cases in which, although suspects had confessed, Johnson rendered their
confessions inadmissible. Even at the time of the Miranda decision, New York allowed
grand juries to consider only admissible evidence. See People v. Cline, 282 N.Y.S.2d 318,
321 (Rensellaer Cty. Ct. 1967) (“[T]he Grand Jury can receive none but legal evidence.”);
Schulhofer, supra note 153, at 517-24. But see Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs, supra note
151, at 1093-97 (replying to Schulhofer). The decline in admissible confessions reported by
the district attorney probably was attributable in part (and perhaps entirely) to Johnson
rather than to Miranda.
158 Schulhofer, supra note 153, at 502.
159 Cassell & Hayman, supra note 32, at 842.
160 Id. at 868-69 tbl.4. George Thomas objected that Cassell and Hayman failed to
include in this category many statements by suspects that, although nominally exculpatory,
were likely to prove helpful to prosecutors and the police. He also noted that at least one of
the pre-Miranda studies with which Cassell and Hayman compared their post-Miranda
findings did include these statements. George C. Thomas, Plain Talk About the Miranda
Empirical Debate: A “Steady-State” Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REV. 933, 949-50
(1996).
161 Cassell & Hayman, supra note 32, at 871.
162 Id. at 871-72.
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author than Hayman, acknowledges his inability to specify either the
numerator or the denominator of the supposed fifty-five to sixty percent preMiranda “successful interrogation” rate. 163 This rate was an amalgam of preMiranda statistics from jurisdictions other than Salt Lake County, and the
numerators and denominators of these statistics apparently differed from one
another. One would be surprised to learn that the denominators (or baselines)
of any of the pre-Miranda statistics matched the one Cassell and Hayman
employed in their post-Miranda study.
A drop in incriminating statements from 55% of 219 suspects to 33.3% of
219 suspects would in fact have meant a loss of forty-seven incriminating
statements, yet only twenty-one of the suspects studied by Cassell and Hayman
invoked their Miranda rights. 164 It is difficult to believe that Miranda caused
the police to lose more than twice as many incriminating statements as the
number of suspects who invoked their rights. Indeed, as suggested above, it
seems doubtful that many of the twenty-one suspects who invoked their rights
would have cooperated with the police in the absence of Miranda.
Cassell and Hayman observed that the police might have failed to obtain
incriminating statements, not because a very small number of suspects who
otherwise might have given incriminating statements invoked their Miranda
rights, but because officers, sensing that some suspects would invoke their
rights, did not attempt to question them. 165 The authors also suggested that
officers resorted more frequently to noncustodial interrogation, which might
have been less effective. 166 When only 21 of 219 suspects invoked their
Miranda rights, however, and when there is no reason to believe that many (or
any) of these suspects would have cooperated in the absence of Miranda, the
most reasonable judgment is that Miranda had little or no effect on the
administration of justice in Salt Lake County. 167
In a third paper, Cassell and a co-author, economist Richard Fowles,
reported that “crime clearances rates fell sharply all over the country
immediately after Miranda.” 168 They presented a multiple regression analysis
purporting to show that Miranda better accounted for this decline than other
possible variables. Cassell and Fowles offered such statements as: “Our
equations suggest . . . that between 8000 and 36,000 more robberies would
have been solved in 1995 in the absence of the Miranda effect.” 169

163

Cassell & Fowles, Still Handcuffing, supra note 151, at [PINCTE 12-13].
Cassell & Hayman, supra note 32, at 869 tbl.4.
165 See id. at 856.
166 See id. at 873-75.
167 George Thomas’s careful and detailed analysis of Cassell and Hayman’s study
reached the same conclusion: “[M]y interpretation of their Salt Lake County data is that
Miranda has had no effect on the overall confession rate, using ‘confession’ to include all
incriminating statements.” Thomas, supra note 160, at 935.
168 Cassell & Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops, supra note 151, at 1067-68.
169 Id. at 1107.
164
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The authors appear to have given little thought to how the police clear
crimes or to how Miranda could have produced the effect they attributed to it.
In evaluating their claims, it seems helpful to distinguish between “primary”
and “secondary” clearances. When the police clear the crime for which a
suspect was arrested, this clearance is “primary.” When they clear other crimes
the suspect acknowledges committing, these clearances are “secondary.” 170
Suspects often provide secondary clearances because they are unlikely to be
charged with the “extra” crimes they confess and because they may in fact be
rewarded for enabling the police to solve previously unsolved cases. 171 Jerome
Skolnick described an Oakland suspect whom Skolnick suspected of faking
some of the more than 400 burglary clearances he provided. 172
Although Cassell and Fowles claimed that Miranda reduced the rate of both
primary and secondary clearances, 173 Miranda could not have appreciably
affected the primary clearance rate. Miranda limits only custodial
interrogation; it restricts only what the police may do after arrest. Crimes are
cleared by arrest, however. The police may lawfully arrest a suspect only upon
probable cause to believe that he committed a crime, and, when they do, they
record the crime for which he was arrested as cleared. The rate of primary
clearances cannot be significantly affected by what happens later, including
whether custodial interrogation produces a confession. 174 Even in the world of
170

See Floyd Feeney, Police Clearances: A Poor Way to Measure the Impact of Miranda
on the Police, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 5 (2000).
171 JOHN E. CONKLIN, ROBBERY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 147 (1972).
172 JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 172 (3d ed. 1994).
173 See Cassell & Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops, supra note 151, at 1123.
174 The conclusion that Miranda could not have caused a significant drop in primary
clearance rates requires one qualification and a few explanations:
First, statements that lead to the arrest of a suspect’s accomplices do not directly affect
clearance rates. Regardless of how many accomplices are arrested, the police can clear a
crime only once. A suspect’s statements, however, sometimes enable the police to arrest
people for crimes other than the ones the suspect himself has cleared. These statements do
improve clearance rates. It is inconceivable, however, that Miranda led to a loss of
statements leading to arrests for crimes other than the suspect’s own crimes often enough to
have affected clearance rates significantly.
Second, not all clearances are “clearances by arrest”; some are “clearances by exceptional
means.” FBI Criminal Justice Info. Servs. Div., Crime in the United States 2013, U.S. DEP’T
JUST., https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/offenses-known-tolaw-enforcement/clearances/clearancetopic_final
[https://perma.cc/C9GH-S8K9]
(last
visited Jan. 24, 2017). The police may clear an offense by exceptional means, however, only
when they have probable cause to arrest someone for this offense but cannot make the arrest
for reasons beyond their control (for example, because the suspect has died or is already
imprisoned for another crime). See id. “Clearance by exceptional means” means “clearance
by virtual arrest.” Postarrest interrogation can no more affect clearances by exceptional
means than it can clearances by arrest. See Cassell & Fowles, Still Handcuffing, supra note
151, at 95-96 n.405 (“Not only are exceptional clearances a relatively small fraction of all
clearances, we have seen no developed argument that the proportion of exceptional
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modern physics, interrogation that occurs after an arrest cannot make the arrest
happen. It cannot make the clearance that the arrest generates happen either.
In their contribution to this Symposium, Cassell and Fowles persist in
claiming the impossible. They write:
The clearance rate appears to be a reasonable (if understated) surrogate
measure for the confession rate. Sometimes police officers, lacking
evidence to clear a case, will bring a suspect in, deliver Miranda
warnings, interrogate, and—if no confession results—release him,
leaving them with insufficient evidence to clear the case. If Miranda
prevented the confession, by discouraging the suspect from talking or
otherwise, the crime may never be cleared . . . . Field research on police
interrogations found that “virtually every detective . . . insisted that more
crimes are solved by police interviews and interrogations than by any
other investigative method.” 175
Every suspect questioned by the police, however, either has been arrested or
has not been, and Miranda cannot cause a reduction in primary clearances in
either situation. When a suspect has not been arrested, Miranda imposes no
restrictions on interrogating him. The failure to record a clearance because an
un-arrested suspect has not cooperated cannot possibly be attributed to
Miranda. And when a suspect has been arrested, the police report the crime for
which he was arrested as “cleared by arrest,” even when the suspect refuses to
submit to interrogation and even when he cannot be prosecuted. Again, no
reduction in primary clearances can conceivably be attributed to Miranda.
Cassell and Fowles strain to find an “in between” category of cases—cases
in which suspects are in custody so that Miranda’s requirements apply but in
which the suspects have not yet been arrested so that their suspected crimes
clearances would have been significantly altered by Miranda.”).
Third, the F.B.I.’s definition of the term “cleared by arrest” indicates that it requires more
than an arrest. This definition directs police departments to clear an offense only when a
suspect has been arrested, charged with the commission of the offense, and turned over to
the court for prosecution. Crime in the United States 2013, supra. But the terms “charged
with the commission of the offense” and “turned over to the court for prosecution” do not
mean what they seem to say. These terms date from an era when police officers rather than
prosecutors filed nearly all charges in court. They were meant to distinguish bona fide
arrests on probable cause from arrests “on suspicion.” See Feeney, supra 170, at 13-17. The
F.B.I. now directs police departments to record an offense as cleared whenever a prosecutor
has declined to prosecute for any reason other than a lack of probable cause for the arrest.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, SUMMARY REPORTING SYSTEM
(SRS) USER MANUAL 116 (v.1.0 2013), https://ucr.fbi.gov/nibrs/summary-reporting-systemsrs-user-manual [https://perma.cc/4XXR-9VMJ]. When the police have lawfully arrested a
suspect, they are to treat his alleged offense as cleared even when they lack sufficient
evidence to prosecute him. The F.B.I.’s dreadful verbiage leads in a circle, and, in the end,
“cleared by arrest” does mean “cleared by arrest.”
175 Cassell & Fowles, Still Handcuffing, supra note 151, at 18 (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Leo, supra note 32, at 373).
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may not be cleared unless they provide incriminating statements. The authors
write, “[F]or cases in which a suspect is questioned in custody but never
ultimately formally arrested, Miranda could have a harmful effect on the
primary clearance rate—that is, a reduction in the ability of police to get
information that they need to clear a crime in the first instance.” 176 But the
category of cases to which they refer appears to be nonexistent; decisions
subsequent to Miranda strongly indicate that only an arrest creates the kind of
custody needed to trigger Miranda’s requirements. 177 Moreover, even if “in
between” cases are conceivable as a matter of law, they must be virtually
nonexistent in practice. 178 Miranda could not have reduced primary clearances
appreciably.
Miranda conceivably might have reduced the number of secondary
clearances, and secondary clearances can be useful. For example, when
someone arrested for a traffic or other minor offense confesses to a serious
crime, his confession may lead to prosecution and punishment, 179 and even
when the prosecution of “secondary” crimes is unlikely, the knowledge that
these crimes have been solved may give comfort to crime victims. Even if
Miranda reduced the number of secondary clearances, however, it did not
“handcuff” the police.
Cassell and Fowles reject Floyd Feeney’s suggestion that a decline in
secondary clearances could have accounted for the entire decline in clearances
they attribute to Miranda. They emphasize that secondary clearances constitute
a small portion of all clearances—far too small a portion to account for a

176

Id. at 84.
See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (holding that interrogation
following a traffic or street corner stop need not be preceded by warnings because, although
the suspect is detained, he is not in custody “to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest’”
(quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S.
492, 495 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that warnings need not precede stationhouse
interrogation when the suspect understands that he is free to leave); Orozco v. Texas, 394
U.S. 324, 326-27 (1969) (holding that a suspect arrested in his bedroom was in custody and
entitled to warnings before the police interrogated him).
178 To be sure, the police might place someone in custody (that is, arrest him) without
probable cause to believe he committed a particular crime. They might then record a
clearance only if the suspect confessed to a crime. In this situation, however, the suspect’s
confession would be inadmissible not only because the police omitted the Miranda warnings
(if they did) but also because the suspect’s confession would be the fruit of an unlawful
arrest. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). Moreover, the police
probably would not be justified in recording a clearance following an unlawfully arrested
suspect’s confession. Only a lawful arrest—an arrest based on probable cause to believe that
a suspect committed a crime—allows the police to treat the crime as one “cleared by arrest.”
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 174, at 112.
179 Cassell and Fowles call this sort of secondary clearance a “more-serious-crime
clearance” and treat it as a distinct category. Cassell & Fowles, Still Handcuffing, supra note
151, at 84.
177
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decline of the magnitude they claim to have shown. 180 The authors infer that
Miranda must have caused a significant reduction in primary clearances as
well. 181 But Miranda simply could not have caused an appreciable decline in
primary clearances. If secondary clearances do not account for the decline the
authors attribute to Miranda, nothing else does either. The only reasonable
inference is that Miranda did not have the impact that Cassell and Fowles
claim.
The Miranda decision was not the only action taken by a court on June 13,
1966. On the same day, a Dallas jury found Jack Ruby legally sane. 182 The
dummy variable that Cassell and Fowles used to separate cases that arose
before Miranda from those that arose after also separates cases that arose
before the Ruby verdict from those that arose after this verdict. The supposedly
“robust” evidence that Cassell and Fowles presented no more demonstrates
that Miranda produced a sharp decline in clearance rates than it demonstrates
that the Ruby verdict did so. 183 Moreover, the claim that Miranda produced the
decline in clearances that the authors attribute to it is barely more plausible
than the claim that the Ruby verdict had this effect. Despite the fleet of
quacking ducks launched by Cassell and Fowles in their contribution to this
Symposium, Miranda essentially governs only postclearance policing.
That Cassell and Fowles purported to show with statistically significant
evidence something that cannot be true is, to put it mildly, a defect of their
study. Floyd Feeney’s review of the Cassell-Fowles study suggested other
defects. Feeney in fact maintained that, when long-term trends and
improvements in crime reporting were taken into account, the supposed sharp
decline in clearance rates that Cassell and Fowles reported “all over the
country immediately after Miranda” 184 was neither sharp nor uniform. 185 To
some extent, F.B.I. clearance statistics reflected, not an increase in unsolved
crimes, but the better reporting of these crimes in several jurisdictions. 186
180

Id. at 62-106 (responding to Feeney).
Id. at 84.
182 See Jack Ruby Found Sane After Trial, BALT. SUN, June 14, 1966, at 1.
183 See Cassell & Fowles, Still Handcuffing, supra note 151, at 106 (“Regression analysis
can never establish causality.”).
184 Cassell & Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops, supra note 151, at 1067-68.
185 See Feeney, supra note 170, at 4.
186 See id. at 9-42. But see Cassell & Fowles, Still Handcuffing, supra note 151, at 62-82
(responding to Feeney). Before the Cassell-Fowles study, Schulhofer responded forcefully
to Cassell’s claim that declining clearance rates supplied “‘strong evidence’ that ‘law
enforcement never recovered from the blow inflicted by Miranda.’” Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Miranda and Clearance Rates, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 278, 279 (1996) (quoting Cassell, All
Benefits, No Costs, supra note 151, at 1090-91); see also John J. Donohue III, Did Miranda
Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (1998) (offering a mixed review of
the Cassell-Fowles study).
Regression analyses on large data sets have become most common form law-related
social science research. Few lawyers have the patience or the ability to understand these
181
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Many of the scholars who concluded that Miranda had little effect on
confession or conviction rates seem to believe that this conclusion says
something nice about Miranda. Stephen Schulhofer, for example, entitled his
response to Cassell “Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and
Vanishingly Small Costs.” 187 Although Schulhofer offered convincing
evidence that Miranda’s costs were small, his paper offered no evidence that
Miranda had produced “substantial benefits.”
If the police obtained confessions unfairly before Miranda and if Miranda
reduced the frequency of their unfair practices, one would expect a reduction in
the number of confessions and probably in the number of convictions. It seems
unlikely that suspects who formerly confessed only after being subjected to
unfair questioning responded to Miranda by providing an equal number of
confessions out of the goodness of their hearts. A far more plausible hypothesis
is that, in what Yale Kamisar called the gatehouses of American criminal
procedure, very little changed. 188
That the overwhelming majority of suspects who hear the Miranda warnings
waive the right to remain silent may be attributable in part to police efforts to
undercut the warnings and to decisions by the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts
Courts limiting Miranda. But waivers of the right to remain silent may also be
attributable to the flawed morality of the right itself. Unlike the Justices of the
Miranda majority, criminal suspects may not believe that refusing to cooperate
with a legitimate governmental inquiry is noble. They may not regard
analyses, but legal scholars typically accept their bottom-line conclusions until, and
sometimes even after, patient, thoughtful scholars like Feeney do the tough work of
dissecting them. Most of these statistical analyses, however, seem to collapse as soon as one
breathes on them. In particular, I have never seen any work by an econometrician that
convinced me of anything. Life is too short to respond to more than a small portion of the
mountain of unconvincing scholarship generated by number-crunching empiricists, but it is
good occasionally to smash a study or two for deterrent reasons. See, e.g., Albert W.
Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering Wound, 51 DUQ. L. REV.
673, 687-91 (2013) (criticizing David S. Abrams, Is Pleading Really a Bargain?, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 200 (2011)); Albert W. Alschuler, Limiting Political Contributions
after McCutcheon, Citizens United, and SpeechNow, 67 FLA. L. REV. 389, 488-92 (2015)
(criticizing Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17
J. ECON. PERSP. 105 (2003)) [hereinafter Alschuler, Limiting Political Contributions]; Albert
W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
1365, 1382-83 (2008) (criticizing Raymond A. Atkins & Paul H. Rubin, Effects of Criminal
Procedure on Crime Rates: Mapping Out the Consequences of the Exclusionary Rule, 46
J.L. & ECON. 157 (2003)); Albert W. Alschuler, Two Guns, Four Guns, Six Guns, More
Guns: Does Arming the Public Reduce Crime?, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 365, 366-71 (1997)
(criticizing John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry
Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1997)).
187 See Schulhofer, supra note 153, at 500.
188 See Kamisar, supra note 3; see also Alschuler, supra note 8, at 971 n.72 (“When
Miranda, the housekeeper, arrived from the mansion, . . . [s]he did a little light dusting and
moved an attractive rug over the dirt.”).
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remaining silent as a fundamental human right. They may understand that
silence in the face of a plausible accusation is unnatural and makes things look
bad for them. They may yield to the basic human impulse to explain. Many of
these suspects, however, may not know what awaits them once they waive
their rights.
CONCLUSION
Fifty years’ experience has confirmed the fourfold failure of the fourfold
warnings. Miranda is a doctrinal failure, an ethical failure, a jurisprudential
failure, and an empirical failure. The chance that the Supreme Court will
reconsider this decision, however, is almost nonexistent. As the Court said
when it declined to overrule Miranda seventeen years ago, this decision “has
become part of our national culture.” 189 In railing against Miranda, I have
played the part of Don Quixote.
This Article, however, offers an object lesson—a caution against judicial
activism, whether of the left or of the right. 190 It shows how badly a court is
likely to botch the job when it abandons its duty to render corrective justice
and pretends to be a legislature.
This Article also shows why lawyers, courts, and scholars should focus
more on the substance of police interrogation practices than on the ritual dance
that precedes them. Rather than fuss about how warnings, waivers, and
invocations of rights should be phrased, courts should forbid altogether many
forms of governmental force, fraud, threats, and promises. They might well
start by condemning as coercive police claims to possess incriminating
evidence they do not have—claims that are likely to terrify innocent suspects
and that have produced many false confessions. 191
Finally, this Article marks a path toward legislative reform. Miranda’s
invitation to legislatures to provide better ways of safeguarding the privilege
against self-incrimination remains open. Someday legislators may notice that
the Fifth Amendment privilege—the real Fifth Amendment privilege—was
more effectively implemented at the time it was written than it is today under
189

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
Several years before the Court reaffirmed Miranda, Richard Leo wrote:
Even if the practical costs of Miranda seem to outweigh the mostly symbolic benefits it
confers . . . , it would be neither viable nor desirable to overrule Miranda at this time in
our history. For Miranda has become an institution in American society, thoroughly
established within our culture and our consciousness . . . . [And] the symbolic message
that such a decision would seem to send—that the police can disregard constitutional
rights when interrogating criminal suspects—would cause a backlash of resentment
against, and more distrust of, American police.
Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 67980 (1996).
190 For some criticism of Roberts Court activism, see Alschuler, Limiting Political
Contributions, supra note 186, at 410-17, 465-74.
191 See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 974-77.
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Miranda. A bold legislature might then forbid backroom interrogation and
restore the civilized regime of questioning by a magistrate that preceded the
development of professional police forces in both England and America.

